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DO ATTORNEYS DO THEIR CLIENTS JUSTICE?
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF LAWYERS' EFFECTS
ON TAX COURT LITIGATION OUTCOMES
Leandra Lederman* & Warren B. Hrung**
"On television, it looks simple enough: You go to court. You
make your case, with feeling, before a sharp-tongued but
well-meaning judge. After a few moments-and a
commercial break-the judge renders a decision. It looks so
easy, you wonder: Who needs a lawyer?"'
"'[O]ne who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client. ,,,2
* William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington. J.D., LL.M., New York University School of Law.
** Senior Financial Economic Analyst, Markets Group, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley. The views
expressed in this Article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
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Polsby, Eric Rasmusen, Robert Rhee, Larry Ribstein, Tanina Rostain, Daniel
Schneider, Jeffrey Stake, and Nancy Staudt for helpful suggestions. The
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Lederman was a member of the faculty of the George Mason University School
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1. Dante Chinni, More Americans Want to be Their Own Perry Mason,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 20, 2001, at 1.
2. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting an "old proverb").
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INTRODUCTION
Do attorneys really obtain better outcomes than clients could
obtain for themselves? The answer to this question is relevant to
myriad areas, including 'divorce, 3 immigration, real estate
transactions, probate,4 bankruptcy,5 tax, social security disability
claims,7 and criminal defense.' Bar groups defending unauthorized
practice of law statutes often argue that nonlawyers may lack the
competence necessary for legal work.9 Opponents counter that
parties can represent themselves adequately, at least in certain
types of cases."°
3. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions,
34 SWAN. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1981); Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a
Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 553 (1993).
4. See Rhode, supra note 3, at 29-30.
5. See Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative
Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 701,709-10
(1996).
6. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOcACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS
AT WORK 83 (1998).
7. See id. at 117; William D. Popkin, The Effect of Representation in
Nonadversary Proceedings-A Study of Three Disability Programs, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 989 (1977).
8. See Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law?
Exploring the Risk of Disparity from Differences in Defense Counsel Under
Guidelines Sentencing, 87 IowA L. REV. 435 (2002).
9. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 5, at 708 ("Opponents of increased
competition never lack examples of nonlawyer providers who have offered
negligent advice, [or] failed to complete essential services. .. ."); North Carolina
State Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, http://www.ncbar.com/programs/
upl.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2006) ("Assistance with the preparation of legal
documents is an area in which this victimization commonly occurs. Bankruptcy
debtors receive bad advice from non-attorneys helping them fill out bankruptcy
forms. Couples seeking to obtain a simple divorce are misled by internet
document preparation services about the legal grounds and requirements for
divorce."); Tennessee Bar Association, Attorney General Announces "We the
People" Will Reform its Business Practices and Pay Refunds, Feb. 9, 2006,
http://www.tba2.org/tbatoday/news/2006/wethepeople-020906.html (last visited
Sept. 7, 2006) ("'Consumers will now know that if they choose to use We The
People ["a self-described 'legal document preparation company'], they will only
receive typing, forms or written overviews-none of which can take the place of
the advice and services of competent, independent lawyers who are licensed to
practice in Tennessee.').
10. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 703-04; Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L.
Rhode, Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An
Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 123-29 (1976); see also Deborah J.
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Another important question for legal advocates is whether
lawyers expedite or delay the resolution of cases. Not only may time
be money-particularly for those paying an attorney by the hour-
but the justice system itself is affected by whether litigated cases
are resolved expeditiously.1' The popular conception of attorneys in
this regard may not be particularly favorable. Professors Gilson and
Mnookin have stated:
Today, the dominant popular view is that lawyers magnify the
inherent divisiveness of dispute resolution. According to this
vision, litigators rarely cooperate to resolve disputes
efficiently. Instead, shielded by a professional ideology that is
said to require zealous advocacy, they endlessly and wastefully
fight in ways that enrich themselves but rarely advantage the
clients.12
Testing empirically whether attorneys improve outcomes can be
very difficult, particularly because the information easiest to access,
13published decisions, ignores the large universe of settled cases.
Fortunately, there is a forum that lends itself to statistical analysis
of this question. In the United States Tax Court ("Tax Court"), a
large portion of the non-government litigants pursue their cases pro
se,"6 providing a natural laboratory for comparing the outcomes that
Cantrell, The Obligation of Legal Aid Lawyers to Champion Practice by
Nonlawyers, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 886 (2004).
11. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal
Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 447 (1996) ("Time to
disposition of cases is an important public policy issue."); Daniel Kessler,
Institutional Causes of Delay in the Settlement of Legal Disputes, 12 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 432, 432 (1996) ("[D]elay in the resolution of legal disputes creates a
wide variety of social costs.").
12. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509,
510-11 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
13. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, at 442 (estimating that 2.9% of
state cases and 5% of federal cases, excluding asbestos cases, are tried); Mori
Irvine, Better Late than Never: Settlement at the Federal Court of Appeals, 1 J.
App. PRAc. & PROCESS 341, 341 (1999) ("Nearly 95% of all federal civil cases will
settle before trial, leaving less than five percent of civil cases to be appealed.")
(footnotes omitted). Similarly, approximately five percent of Tax Court cases
result in an opinion decision. See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?:
An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
315, 317 n.2 (1999) (citing information obtained from the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") in response to a Freedom of Information Act request).
14. According to IRS data, in "Tax Court Appeals Settlements" of cases
other than small tax cases ("S cases"), for fiscal year 1993, for example, 46.01%
of taxpayers were pro se. Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service,
1237
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
pro se and represented litigants reach with the same adversary, the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")." Tax Court litigation also offers a
rare and valuable opportunity" to examine settlement results"
because it retains records for cases the parties settle.18
Furthermore, Tax Court cases are civil cases that typically involve
disputes over monetary amounts, so case results are easy to
quantify and compare.19
This Article exploits this opportunity to test the effects
attorneys have on case outcomes, using a unique data set consisting
Report Prepared for American Bar Association Tax Section Court Procedure
Committee at Scottsdale, Ariz. 15 (Jan. 2001) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
January 2001 IRS Report]. The comparable figure for 1994 was 48.97%. Id.
For cases tried and decided by the Tax Court for fiscal year 1993 (other than S
cases), 41.32% of taxpayers were pro se. Id. at 16. The comparable figure for
1994 was 35.58%. Id. The report does not state at what point pro se status was
determined.
15. The Tax Court litigation studied here involve IRS assertions of a
"deficiency" (essentially an understatement of tax). See infra note 96 and
accompanying text. The IRS formally asserts a tax deficiency by sending the
taxpayer a letter known as a "notice of deficiency." See I.R.C. § 6212
(LexisNexis 2006). The taxpayer generally has ninety days within which to
respond by petitioning the Tax Court. See id. § 6213(a).
16. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a
System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) (stating that settled
cases are often "invisible" despite their prevalence); see also Robert H. Gertner,
Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in Litigation, 1993 U.
CHi. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 76 ("In only rare and special circumstances is
detailed data available on disputes that are settled prior to trial. .. ").
17. A prior study of Tax Court cases by Professor Lederman found that
cases do not randomly settle or go to trial, and that particular case
characteristics, such as aspects of the judge to which the case is assigned,
influence that outcome. See Lederman, supra note 13, at 332. That study found
that the presence of counsel for the taxpayer did not have a statistically
significant effect on whether or not the case was tried. Id. at 338-39, app. E at
357. This Article builds on the data used in that study to focus on the effect the
presence of taxpayer counsel has on the financial outcome of the case and the
length of time to settlement or trial.
18. See Lederman, supra note 13, at 327 & n.47.
19. The Tax Court is the forum of choice for most taxpayers litigating
against the IRS. See Leandra Lederman, "Civil"izing Tax Procedure: Applying
General Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 183, 185 & n.11 (1996). The principal reason that the overwhelming
majority of litigated federal tax cases go to Tax Court is that the taxpayer need
not pay the amount in dispute before petitioning the Tax Court. See Lundy v.
IRS, 45 F.3d 856, 860 n.7 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Comm'r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235 (1995) ("The advantage of and reason for the
Tax Court is that the average taxpayer can challenge a notice of deficiency
without first having to pay the deficient amount.").
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of a random sample of settled and tried Tax Court cases. It tests
empirically the effect the presence of counsel for the taxpayer has
both on the financial outcome of the case (the proportion of the tax
in issue recovered by the IRS) and the length of time to settlement
or trial.2 ° In order to isolate the effects of attorneys, the statistical
analyses control for such factors as the amount at stake in the case,
the type of taxpayer (individual, estate, or corporation), and the
complexity of the case. As discussed further below, the results
suggest that attorneys obtain significantly better results in tried
cases than unrepresented taxpayers do-and that the magnitude of
that effect increases with greater attorney experience-but,
surprisingly, that attorneys do not obtain better outcomes in settled
cases. The results also suggest that taxpayers' attorneys do not
affect the amount of time Tax Court cases take to settle or go to
trial. The implications of these findings are examined infra in Parts
II.C. and III.C.
This Article has three principal parts. First, Part I unpacks the
characteristics of attorneys that may affect litigation outcomes,
discussing five distinct ways in which attorneys typically differ from
litigants appearing pro se.
Next, Part II of the Article examines how attorneys can affect
the monetary outcome of cases. Part II.A discusses both how, in
theory, the five aspects of attorney representation discussed in Part
I may influence the financial outcomes in tried cases and presents
the results of the empirical study of this question. Part II.B does the
same for settled cases. Part II.C analyzes the implications of the
results, which suggest a strong, positive effect of attorneys on
outcomes in tried cases-an effect that increases with attorney
experience-but no significant effect in settled cases.
Part III of the Article analyzes how attorneys might affect the
time cases take to resolve. Part III.A discusses both (1) how the five
aspects of attorney representation may influence the timing of trials,
and (2) the results of empirical analysis of this question. Part III.B
does the same for settlements. Finally, Part III.C analyzes the
results, which suggest that attorneys neither delay nor expedite
trials or settlements. Following Part III, the Article concludes.
20. As discussed in the Appendix, Professor Lederman collected and
compiled the data used in this study. See infra note 180 and accompanying
text.
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I. UNPACKING ATTORNEY CHARACTERISTICS
THAT AFFECT LITIGATION
The feature that most distinguishes settlement negotiations
from other bargaining contexts is the presence of lawyers, yet
traditional accounts of suits and settlements generally ignored their21
presence. Although the theoretical effects of certain attorney
behaviors have been analyzed,22  there is no comprehensive
treatment of the features attorneys bring to litigation that differ
from pro se litigants, and how those features affect cases' outcomes.
Intuition suggests that attorneys should add value, but is that really
the case? And, even if they do, does that come at the expense of
prolonged litigation?
Attorneys representing litigation clients differ from pro se
litigants in at least five ways that may affect case outcomes."
Unlike most pro se litigants, attorneys typically are trained experts,
24 2repeat players, agents rather than principals 25 their fees add
21. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 12, at 510 ("[Tlhe economic
literature, with rare exceptions, shares a troublesome feature. Almost by
convention, litigation is modeled as a two-person game between principals,
thereby abstracting away the legal system's central institutional
characteristic-litigation is carried out by agents.") (footnotes omitted); Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look
at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 81 (1997) ("Although most
accounts of lawsuit settlement . . . share the simplifying assumption that
litigation is a two-party activity carried out by a plaintiff and a defendant, the
feature of litigation bargaining that most differentiates it from other types of
negotiation is the presence of lawyers.") (footnotes omitted).
22. See, e.g., William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14
OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 367, 376-82 (1999) (discussing five lawyer types:
Champion, Hired Gun, Litigator, Healer, and Problem Solver); Gilson &
Mnookin, supra note 12, passim (discussing effects of cooperative and
.gladiator" attorney behavior).
23. The context for the discussion in this Article is private sector attorneys.
Government attorneys, such as the IRS attorneys who taxpayers face, likely
have different incentives and goals than private attorneys because of the
difference in compensation structure and the different nature of the government
client. That is, IRS attorneys are paid a salary that does not vary with their
caseload and have as the client a government agency that is a repeat player but
does not fully internalize its costs.
24. See Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit
Cooperation? Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STuD. 39, 42
(2002) ("Most litigants do not appear frequently in court, so most litigation is
between one-shot litigants. Many attorneys, by contrast, appear frequently
enough that even particular pairs of attorneys oppose each other repeatedly.");
see also Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 12, at 513.
25. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 12, at 527; see also Herbert M.
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transaction costs, and their litigation decisions may be less affected
by certain cognitive biases. Each of these aspects of attorneys is
surveyed briefly below and then applied in context in Parts II and
III of this Article, in order to determine their likely effects on
financial outcomes and the timing of settlements and trials.
A. Expertise
Attorneys are experts who have both specialized training and
often specialize in a particular practice area. This expertise
contrasts with the lack of legal expertise a typical pro se litigant
has.26 Although the likely benefits to litigants of attorney expertise
27is an obvious point, it is an important one.
B. Repeat Player Effects
There are at least two possible ways in which the presence of an
attorney who is a repeat player in a particular court or bar is
relevant to litigation outcomes.28 First, repeat experiences should
give rise to increased expertise and credibility. Second, attorneys
who are repeat players in a particular type of litigation and on a
particular side,"' as private tax controversy attorneys are, will have
stakes beyond the single litigation,3 much as litigants who are
Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the
Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1967 (2002). A lawyer's
interest in this regard depends on the fee arrangement with the client. See Earl
Johnson, Jr., Lawyers' Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment
Decisions, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 567, 568-69 (1980-1981).
26. See David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent
Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 17, 26-27 ("[M]ost pro se taxpayers do not
adequately know the Tax Court Rules or the Federal Rules of Evidence and are
thus handicapped in the courtroom."); cf KRITZER, supra note 6, at 109 ("[Tlhe
training in procedure and evidence combined with the formal advocacy
experience tax lawyers . . . have provides a background that better serves the
client in the [Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission] hearing context.").
27. See KRITZER, supra note 6, at 201 ("My observations make it clear that
expertise is central to effective advocacy."); see also id. at 83 (reporting statistics
on outcomes in hearings before the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission).
28. In the Tax Court litigation context, many of the attorneys may be
repeat players in the tax controversy bar and should routinely face the IRS,
even if they try relatively few cases.
29. See Susan Brodie Haire et al., Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, and
Judicial Decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 33 LAW & SOCy REV.
667, 673 (1999).
30. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 95, 116 (1974).
31. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL
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repeat players do.32 Such attorneys may be most concerned with
establishing reputations that maintain or increase their
effectiveness in the relevant bar or courts.33
Professors Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin famously
analyzed the effects of attorneys on the multi-round prisoner's
dilemma "litigation game."34 In a prisoner's dilemma, the highest
aggregate payoff is if both parties cooperate, but each party has an
incentive to defect. Gilson and Mnookin argued that lawyers could
help overcome the dilemma by establishing reputations as
cooperators; clients could credibly commit to cooperate in resolving
• 35
the dispute by choosing a lawyer with a cooperative reputation.
Alternatively, it is possible that a lawyer might seek to
establish a reputation as what Gilson and Mnookin term a
"gladiator."36 Such an attorney might refuse to accept a settlement
offer or demand a more favorable settlement in order to establish or
further a reputation as a tough negotiator.37 This may be viewed as
a form of strategic behavior.38
L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2000); Galanter, supra note 30, at 97-103.
32. See Galanter, supra note 30, at 101; Lederman, supra note 13, at 342.
33. See Galanter, supra note 30, at 118. Attorneys are constrained by
ethical rules from certain strategies that principals who are repeat players can
follow, such as "trading off some cases for gains on others." Id. at 117 & n.52
(quoting Lawrence E. Rothstein, The Myth of Sisyphus: Legal Services Efforts
on Behalf of the Poor, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 502 (1974)).
34. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 12, at 512.
35. See generally id. The GilsonfMnookin model treats the hiring of an
attorney of a particular type as a reliable signal of the party's litigation
strategy. See id. at 549.
36. See id. at 539; see also Johnston & Waldfogel, supra note 24, at 44.
37. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 712-13 (1986); see also Peter H.
Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous Litigation Games,
23 REV. LITIG. 47, 73 (2004) ("[L]awyers may exacerbate cognitive and emotional
issues, due to conflicts of interest and repeat-play considerations, such as those
involving developing a reputation for being tough or playing hardball in pretrial
settlement negotiations.").
38. See Coffee, supra note 37. He states:
Although a refusal to accept a reasonable settlement offer may be
illogical in terms of an individual case, such a refusal may signal a
plaintiffs attorney's toughness at bargaining, which could enhance his
position in future settlement negotiations. Willingness to go to trial
distinguishes this attorney from others who seldom try their cases.
Even more importantly, a litigated victory may significantly enhance
a lawyer's reputation ....
Id. at 713. That is, gladiator attorneys may add agency costs in the form of
rejection of reasonable settlement offers. See id. at 712-13; see infra Part I.C for
1242 [Vol. 41
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Professors Rachel Croson and Robert Mnookin examined
whether the predictions of the Gilson/Mnookin model were borne out
in laboratory experiments. 9 In one game, the "litigation game,"
subjects chose a cooperative lawyer, a gladiator lawyer, or a lawyer
who used a combination of those approaches.4 ° In a different game,
termed the "prelitigation game," subjects chose a lawyer type and
then were matched with an opposing party. The rules of that game
allowed those who chose a cooperative lawyer and faced a lawyer
belonging to one of the other two types to change to another type of
lawyer.41
In each game, the lawyers played the game on the subjects'
behalf. The study found that "significantly more cooperative agents
are chosen in the prelitigation game than in the litigation game.'
These results suggest that the ability to change attorneys (or change
litigating style) may have a disciplining effect, encouraging both
attorneys to remain cooperative.43
Subsequently, Professors Jason Scott Johnston and Joel
Waldfogel tested whether repeat play by attorneys elicits
cooperation, using a data set of federal civil cases.44 They found that
"attorneys are more likely to pursue cooperative litigation strategies
when they frequently litigate against each other (and therefore
expect to litigate against each other in the future with a high
probability)."45 They also found that "a history of attorney repeat
a discussion of agency costs.
39. Rachel Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents
Enhance Cooperation? Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331 (1997).
40. Id. at 335-36.
41. Id. at 336. The possibility provided the subjects of changing from a
cooperative lawyer to a gladiator (or partial gladiator) might decrease
cooperation compared to allowing no option to switch because, after all, subjects
are only allowed to change in the direction of gladiator behavior. Id. at 339.
However, because the rules are known up front, the option to switch from a
cooperative lawyer to a gladiator but not the reverse may encourage subjects to
select a cooperative lawyer in the prelitigation game because that will be their
only chance to select a cooperative lawyer; the selection is without risk, given
the option to switch to a gladiator if the other party does not choose a
cooperative lawyer; and the subjects know that the payoff if both parties
cooperate is higher than if both parties defect.
42. Id. at 341.
43. In actual litigation, parties can change attorneys during the litigation,
though such changes may be costly. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 12, at
524 ("[T]he price of firing [a] lawyer is the cost of bringing another lawyer up to
speed in the litigation. While not a prohibition on changing lawyers, switching
costs impose a substantial penalty on defection.").
44. See Johnston & Waldfogel, supra note 24.
45. Id. at 59. The opposite result held true for attorneys in their data set
1243
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interaction [had] a significant negative effect on... the duration of
legal disputes.' 6
C. Agency Costs of Representation
Attorneys are clients' agents. The presence of a lawyer as agent
of a client-principal introduces costs that unrepresented litigants do
not face, because, if lawyers are rational actors, they may tend to
maximize interests that differ from those of their clients.
Because [an] agent does not reap the full reward from his
efforts on the principal's behalf, and because the agent knows
more than the principal about what the agent is doing... the
agent has the incentive and opportunity to act-whether alone
or in concert with others-in numerous ways that harm the
principal's interests.47
For example, "there are significant incentives for lawyers not to
embrace early settlement. These incentives include the need to
market services, the desire not to appear weak, the obligation to
represent a client zealously, the thirst for justice, and last, but
perhaps not least, the desire to maximize income."48  Thus, the
who were classmates. See id. at 55-58; infra note 164.
46. Johnston & Waldfogel, supra note 24, at 59. Interestingly, they also
found that "cases that involve at least one nonlocal attorney are more likely to
be tried, and tend to last longer, than cases that involve two local attorneys."
Id. at 55. They explain:
In cases that involve one or more nonlocal attorneys, the attorneys are
less likely to be familiar with one another and thus may find it more
difficult to coordinate on a cooperative solution. They also likely
perceive a lower probability of future interaction and, thus, are less
responsive to potential future retaliation for failure to cooperate.
Id. Johnston and Waldfogel found that these effects were stronger for attorneys
representing clients who were not themselves repeat players. Id. at 59-60.
They "interpret[ed] this as evidence in favor of the hypothesis that it [is] not
just that repeat-player attorneys learn how to cooperate with one another but
that they have strong reputational interests in cooperating with attorneys they
expect to soon encounter again." Id. They add, "[ilnstitutional parties still get
the advantage of attorney familiarity. But because their own reputational
interest is at stake, such clients effectively control and override the independent
strategic interests of their attorneys." Id. at 60.
47. George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met Professional
Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 279 (1998). He adds, "[t]he principal
must. . . find ways to control these agency costs. The primary means of control
are monitoring, which involves frequent checking up on the agent, and bonding,
which involves less frequent checking but large penalties for discovered
misbehavior." Id. at 279-80.
48. Coyne, supra note 22, at 369. There are other sources of agency costs in
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attorney's compensation arrangement might affect whether the
attorney delays or expedites case resolution, even unconsciously.4 9
Ethical rules address this concern 5 but probably do not fully resolve
it.
51
D. Transaction Costs of Representation
The presence of an attorney as an agent of the client also gives
rise to legal fees, which are a form of transaction cost.52  An
agreement to pay an attorney by the hour might make a litigant
willing to accept a less advantageous settlement in order to avoid
additional fees.53 Unrepresented taxpayers may therefore be more
the litigation context, as well. For example, the attorney might focus more
effort on cases involving large or repeat clients and therefore spend less than
the optimal amount of time on another client's case. Of course, attorneys may
also be concerned about ethics and professionalism. See Johnson, supra note
25, at 603.
49. See Kritzer, supra note 25, at 1966-67 & n.132. Kritzer points out that
"[olverbilling, which is the incentive created by hourly fees, also creates
significant ethical issues." Id. at 1967 n.132 (citing various articles). Professors
Gilson and Mnookin also discuss another type of agency cost in the attorney-
client relationship. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 12, at 528 ("For a lawyer
with a limited number of clients, a particular client may be so important that
the threat of withdrawn patronage may induce the lawyer to risk his
cooperative reputation by behaving noncooperatively."). George Cohen lists
other possible agency costs of legal representation: "lawyers colluding with their
clients against others," Cohen, supra note 47, at 281, and "the fact that clients,
their lawyers, and third parties may all have agency problems within
themselves," id. at 284. In the interest of simplicity, this Article treats the
client as a single unit and lawyers as practicing alone.
50. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide in part that, subject to
an exception in paragraph (b), "a lawyer shall not represent a client if ... there
is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited ... by a personal interest of the lawyer." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2006). For further discussion of the ethical issues
raised by attorneys' incentives, see generally Cohen, supra note 47; Kritzer,
supra note 25.
51. See Terry Thomason, Are Attorneys Paid What They're Worth?
Contingent Fees and the Settlement Process, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 222 (1991).
Competition among attorneys may help reduce inefficiencies created by agency
costs, however. See Robert J. Rhee, Measuring the Effect of Risk on
Legal Valuation: Is a Lawsuit an Option or an Asset?, 78 U. COLO. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=904776.
52. See Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 7 (2002).
53. Cf Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, How Would You Like
to Pay for That? The Strategic Effects of Fee Arrangements on Settlement Terms,
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"patient" in settlement negotiations than taxpayers with attorneys
54
are.
E. Do Attorneys Bring Greater Objectivity to Litigation Decisions?
Cognitive biases--"systematic errors in judgment and
prediction""-may affect litigants' decisionmaking.56  Cognitive
biases that may affect decisions such as whether to accept a
settlement offer include (1) optimism bias, which is the systematic
tendency to overestimate the strength of one's own case;57 (2) risk-
aversion or risk-seeking behavior;58 (3) "aspirations" (high hopes)
with respect to settlement amounts; 9 and (4) regret aversion, which
1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 53, 54 (1996) ("A client whose lawyer is paid on an
hourly basis must pay more when her lawyer works more hours. Because every
hour spent by the lawyer at trial reduces the net payoff to the client, the client
will be eager to have the case resolved in negotiation, rather than at trial.").
54. See Korobkin, supra note 52, at 10. In the basic economic model of
litigation, the more patient party should capture more of the surplus generated
by settlement. See id. at 10-11; infra notes 148-49 (explaining this model). Of
course, the IRS, as an administrative agency, does not bear its own costs. In
addition, the IRS's costs may be relatively fixed regardless of whether a
particular case takes more or less time to resolve. See Lederman, supra note
13, at 342 & n.148. The importance of litigant patience to settlement timing is
discussed below. See infra note 165 and text accompanying notes 165-70.
55. Ian Weinstein, Don't Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in
Legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 784 n.2 (2003); see also Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
56. Litigants do not always-or perhaps even typically-make decisions as
the rational actors contemplated by the basic economic model of suit and
settlement. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 21, at 79-81; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 116-18
(1996); see also Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk,
Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 145 (1998) ("Cognitive
psychology and experimental economics have found a smorgasbord of cognitive
errors, which collectively falsify most of the axioms of rational choice theory.").
57. See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR:
A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
2169, 2224-26 (1993); Amy Farmer et al., The Causes of Bargaining Failure:
Evidence from Major League Baseball, 47 J. LAW & ECON. 543, 548 & n.14
(2004).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 70-71, 153-54.
59. See Korobkin, supra note 52, at 3 ("The term 'aspiration' is defined here
as the ideal target settlement sum, or set of terms, for which a litigant strives in
negotiations, although achieving that target provides no discontinuous external
benefit."). A plaintiffs financial settlement aspiration is the target amount the
plaintiff hopes to receive, as distinct from a "reservation price," which, in the
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is the desire to avoid feelings of regret associated with learning that
one passed up what turned out to be a superior outcome. °
Professors Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie "contend that
lawyers are more likely than litigants to apply an expected financial
value analysis to the settlement-versus-trial decision, whereas
certain cognitive and social-psychological phenomena that can
distract from expected value analysis are more likely to influence
litigants."61 By contrast, Professor John DiPippa argues that:
[Playing a lawyer may not avert cognitive error if both lawyer
and client misperceive the underlying level of risk. Moreover,
cognitive errors persist even with learning. Learning requires
feedback and many decisions do not lend themselves to
case of a plaintiff, is the minimum the plaintiff will accept. Korobkin found
evidence of an aspiration effect in an experiment with law students; students
provided with high aspirations in the experiment tended to have higher
reservation prices than students provided with a low aspiration. See id. at 38-
40. He also found evidence that subjects given a low aspiration were more
likely to accept a settlement above the stated reservation price (rather than
demand more) than were subjects given the same offer and the same
reservation price, but a high aspiration. See id. at 51-52.
60. See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion
Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 72-73. Professor Garvin
notes:
This branch of cognitive theory is built on the unremarkable premise
that we have a tendency to kick ourselves when a decision goes
wrong-not entirely because of the result, but also because there was
something else we could have done that would have turned out better
(or so we think).
Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential Damages:
Default Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339, 416 (1998).
Accordingly,
even on the old Monty Hall game show, Let's Make a Deal,
participants were typically reluctant to switch the door they initially
picked (so as to avoid the dread feeling of regret should their initial
choice have been correct), despite the fact that the structure of the
game made accepting the offer to switch a significantly better
strategy.
Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get
Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1277 (2002).
61. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 21, at 82; cf Lynn A. Baker,
Commentary, Facts About Fees: Lessons For Legal Ethics, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1985,
1989 (2002) ("[T]he defendant-client has likely hired the attorney to provide
precisely this sort of 'expert' information [on the optimal amount and timing of
settlement offers], and is therefore highly likely to heed the attorney's
(potentially self-interested) recommendation regarding the timing and amount
of any settlement offer.").
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feedback or are self-fulfilling. This is especially true in legal
counseling when many decisions cannot be revised after
assessing the consequences or are not subject to accurate
assessment. 2
Korobkin and Guthrie admit that experts generally are as prone
to cognitive biases as lay people are. 3 However, they counter those
findings with an argument that the analytical skills of lawyers,
combined with their legal training, might lead them "to analyze
legal conflicts carefully and unemotionally rather than to react to
them viscerally .... Perhaps, then, lawyers approach decisions from
a different perspective than most other people or are better able to
learn from their experiences than other professionals, or both."'
Another important aspect of attorneys representing clients is
that they are agents rather than principals, as discussed supra in
Part I.C.6' Even if a lawyer acting on his or her own behalf may be
as prone to cognitive biases as nonlawyers, those biases may be
reduced when representing another. The old adage, "one who is his
own lawyer has a fool for a client,"66 may reflect the notion that
litigants are generally very emotionally invested in the outcomes of
their own cases.67 In addition, attorneys, as repeat players, benefit
from diversification of their litigation portfolios, while pro se
litigants typically do not. Both diversification and greater emotional
62. John M.A. DiPippa, How Prospect Theory Can Improve Legal
Counseling, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 81, 92 (2001). Another article
explains that certain "explanations for settlement reflect the cultural, cognitive,
and psychological or affective orientations of the disputants themselves, as
much as the circumstances of the individual case, or the advice of their lawyer."
Julie Macfarlane, Why Do People Settle?, 46 MCGILL L.J. 663, 669 (2001).
Professor Macfarlane adds that "[tihese types of explanations are of course of
even greater significance where the client is unrepresented." Id. at 669 n.13.
63. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 21, at 86. But cf Garvin, supra note
60, at 419 ("[L]earning [as a means of overcoming cognitive biases] works, at
least some of the time and for some of the subjects.").
64. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 21, at 87-88; but cf Chris Guthrie et
al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) (finding that
judges, like lay people, are susceptible to cognitive biases).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
66. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (referring to it as an "old proverb").
67. Cf. Huang, supra note 37, at 75 ("[E]ven if... litigants themselves fail
to be sequentially rational due to, for example, cognitive difficulties, they hire
lawyers who provide not only legal knowledge and expertise, but also
negotiating experience and professionalism.").
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distance should facilitate more objective decisionmaking in each
individual case.68
Korobkin and Guthrie argue that there are two different ways
in which attorneys can work to reduce psychological barriers to the
settlement of lawsuits: "First, they can attempt to negotiate in a
manner that prevents the barriers from being constructed in the
first place. Second, because it is highly unlikely that attorneys will
successfully avoid all psychological barriers, attorneys can work to
minimize the effect of already-erected barriers on settlement
behavior."69 For example, because people generally are risk-averse
when choosing between options framed as "gains" but risk-seeking
when choosing between options framed as "losses" and have a
stronger reaction to losses than to gains,70 an attorney representing
a defendant may reframe the litigation for the client to help the
client perceive settlement opportunities as gains rather than
losses.71
Professors Korobkin and Guthrie conducted a study involving a
hypothetical litigation scenario in which undergraduate students
were asked to imagine themselves as the plaintiff and practicing
attorneys were asked to imagine themselves as the plaintiffs
lawyer. They found that
the litigants as a class appeared to take into account whether
the settlement offer appeared to be a gain or loss from a pre-
accident reference point, even when doing so caused them to
reject the option that would maximize their expected financial
return from litigation, while the lawyers apparently did not.7 2
Similarly, "the opening offer ... had a statistically significant effect
on the likelihood that litigant subjects would accept the final
settlement offer, but it did not have a significant effect on the
likelihood that lawyer subjects would advise their clients to accept
68. Cf Rhee, supra note 51, at 55 (because attorneys, unlike most clients,
have a litigation portfolio, they may be less risk averse and therefore obtain
more favorable results than an unrepresented litigant would).
69. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement:An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 160-61 (1994).
70. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 55, at 263.
71. See Rachlinski, supra note 56, at 147, 171-72 & n.219; see also DiPippa,
supra note 62, at 100, 102-03. The same effect may be true in Tax Court
litigation, where the taxpayer is the one who stands to have to make a payment.
See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
72. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 21, at 101.
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the offer,"73 demonstrating that litigants were more influenced than
attorneys were by "anchors."74
The results of the Korobkin and Guthrie study suggest that
lawyers may evaluate settlement offers differently from the way
litigants do.75 In order to test whether attorneys can in fact reduce
clients' cognitive biases, using litigation scenarios in which
undergraduate students were asked to imagine that they were
plaintiffs who had received a settlement offer, Korobkin and Guthrie
tested four possible techniques, all in the form of explanations or
counseling purportedly provided by the student subject's lawyer.
The techniques consisted of: (1) an explanation about "the way
psychological factors have been found to operate in other contexts;"76
(2) an explanation of both the positive and negative aspects of the
settlement offer; (3) a recommendation to accept the offer, based on
expected value analysis; and (4) a recommendation of settlement,
without explanation.77  They found that all four techniques
"increased the propensity of litigant subjects to favor settlement"7
and "that all four strategies produced remarkably similar results."79
73. Id. at 105 (footnote omitted).
74. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974) ("In many situations, people
make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the
final answer .... [The] adjustments are typically insufficient. That is, different
starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial
values. We call this phenomenon anchoring.") (footnote omitted). Korobkin &
Guthrie's study found similar results with respect to "equity seeking," Korobkin
& Guthrie, supra note 21, at 111-12, which is the attempt to maintain equity in
relationships, id. at 108.
75. This may be because of lawyers' training and expertise, as Korobkin
and Guthrie suggest. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64. It also may be
because attorneys, as agents rather than principals, may be less likely to
experience some of the particular cognitive biases that the parties themselves
do, as posited in text accompanying notes 64-67. Korobkin and Guthrie's study
did not distinguish between the two possibilities because it did not test how
practicing attorneys would respond to the hypothetical scenarios if they were
asked to imagine themselves as plaintiffs rather than as plaintiffs' attorneys (or
how students would respond if asked to imagine themselves acting on behalf of
someone else). Nonetheless, the reason that attorneys did not succumb to the
cognitive bias tested does not particularly matter, given that the role they were
asked to play in the experiment (attorney) is the same one they have in
litigation.
76. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 21, at 115.
77. Id. at 116-18.
78. Id. at 119.
79. Id. at 119-20.
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Thus, the study results suggest that attorneys may be able to
influence litigants' evaluations of settlement opportunities.
Of course, attorneys may suffer from their own biases that may
affect their behavior. Attorney biases, not experienced by the
litigants themselves, would be a form of agency cost.80 For example,
in Tax Court litigation, attorneys may suffer from regret aversion in
spite of the fact that they will not be liable for any taxes due. That
is, attorneys can suffer regret at failing to obtain a trial outcome as
favorable as a settlement that was offered. In fact, an attorney in
that situation may risk non-payment of fees, the loss of future
business from that client, reputational harm, and, in an extreme
case, a possible legal malpractice suit.8 '
It is also possible that attorneys could exploit clients' cognitive
biases for their own ends, which would also be a form of agency cost.
For example, an attorney who wants to take a case to trial for his or
her own reputational or fee-related reasons might reframe gains
from settlement opportunities as losses in order to encourage risk-
seeking behavior on the part of the client.82 However, the results of
Professor Leandra Lederman's prior study of Tax Court litigation
suggest that, at least on average, attorneys do not either avoid
trying cases or try cases disproportionately; the presence of an
attorney for the taxpayer did not have a statistically significant
effect on whether or not a case went to trial.83
80. See supra Part I.C (discussing agency costs).
81. Cf. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 21, at 123 ("An hourly fee lawyer
who calculates that his reputation would be harmed more by losing a trial than
it would be enhanced by winning a trial might favor settlement after all, despite
his immediate financial incentive to favor trial.") (footnote omitted).
82. See Coyne, supra note 22, at 387 ("A Champion[-style lawyer] will
assure the client that there is no immediate risk and will discuss the route to
victory, with the predictable, and intended, effect of diminishing the client's
pain. The client then feels comfortable with the status quo, may begin to see
the future choice as involving loss rather than gain, and may begin to prefer the
risk of trial to the certainty of a settlement."); Rachlinski, supra note 56, at 172
("An avaricious defense attorney who works on an hourly rate may portray all
settlements as losses so as to encourage the risk-seeking proclivities of the
client. After all, the defense attorney is the principle beneficiary of risk-seeking
decisions in litigation. Likewise, a plaintiffs attorney, operating on a
contingency fee and interested in a quick settlement, may encourage the client's
inherent risk-aversion."). In theory, such behavior could delay settlements in
cases that settle, but, as discussed below, analysis of the data did not find such
delay. See infra text accompanying notes 171-72.
83. See Lederman, supra note 13, at 338. In the current study, the
coefficient of the Attorney variable was not significant in the first stage of the
selection regressions, similarly indicating that the fact of representation does
not have a statistically significant effect on whether or not a case settles.
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II. THE EFFECTS OF ATTORNEYS ON FINANCIAL OUTCOMES
For lawyers to earn their keep, one would expect that they
obtain better outcomes for their clients than unrepresented litigants
achieve themselves.84  And, in theory, the characteristics of
representation, discussed above,85  generally should improve
litigants' financial outcomes in tried cases, as discussed infra in Part
II.A.
86
A. Attorneys' Effects on Financial Judgments
Most notably, as experts and repeat players in the court system,
litigating attorneys should have better knowledge than
unrepresented litigants of court rules and procedures8 7 and better
access to information about what the opposing party 8 or judge likely
84. Clients do pay for lawyers' assistance, which indicates that they believe
that attorneys add value. Some of the value that an attorney adds may consist
of saving time for the client because of the attorney's greater familiarity with
the dispute-resolution process. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat
Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 657 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("One reason
people hire lawyers is to economize on their own investment of time in resolving
disputes."). An attorney may also help the client manage the psychological
difficulties of dispute resolution. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the
Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 9 (1986) ("For plaintiffs and defendants
alike, litigation proves a miserable, disruptive, painful experience. Few
litigants have a good time or bask in the esteem of their fellows-indeed, they
may be stigmatized.") (footnotes omitted); cf Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note
21, at 101 ("On the few occasions that lawyers [studied, in deciding whether to
accept a settlement,] referred to considerations other than the expected
monetary values of the settlement offer and potential trial verdicts, they
mentioned the hidden financial and emotional costs of the litigation process.").
85. See supra Part I.
86. Tried cases and settled cases are discussed separately because
attorneys' effects on judges may not be the same as their effects in negotiations
with the IRS.
87. Cf KRITZER, supra note 6, at 14-15 (explaining "three subdimensions of
expertise").
88. Cf Alison Watts, Bargaining Through an Expert Attorney, 10 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 168, 172 (1994) (explaining that the attorney in her model, "is
regarded as an expert because she can learn part of the defendant's private
information at a fraction . . .of its cost to the plaintiff"). Information about
prior settlements might help an attorney hone in on a likely settlement range.
See Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows:
Information About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV.
663, 672 (2001). Greater accuracy in determining the settlement range should
both increase the frequency of settlement and result in better settlement
outcomes. See id.
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will do. Accordingly, lawyers should have more accurate
information than pro se litigants do about likely outcomes at trial.89
Herbert Kritzer found, in a context somewhat analogous to Tax
Court litigation-hearings before the Wisconsin Tax Appeals
Commission-that the substantive and procedural expertise of tax
attorneys made them far better advocates than unrepresented
taxpayers or nonlawyer tax specialists.90 Experience and expertise
may be particularly helpful in Tax Court cases, where the IRS is
always represented and, in fact, is represented by counsel who
routinely sees numerous similar cases; 9' the IRS benefits from an
asymmetry in expertise and familiarity with the Tax Court when
facing an unrepresented taxpayer.92 Similarly, if attorneys are
better decisionmakers than the litigants themselves because
attorneys succumb to cognitive biases less often, that, too, could
result in better outcomes for represented taxpayers.9
89. See Stephen M. Bundy & Einer R. Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the
Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79
CAL. L. REV. 313, 332 (1991) ("Lawyers know more than clients about whether
information about primary conduct is favorable, unfavorable, or irrelevant.
Lawyers also know more about the available procedures and techniques for
investigation, presentation, withholding, and suppression, about the sanctions
applicable to clients' evidentiary conduct, and about whether information is
favorable, unfavorable, or irrelevant on the issue of whether evidentiary
sanctions should be imposed.").
90. KRITZER, supra note 6, at 82-84, 108-09; cf. Richard N. Block & Jack
Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards, 40
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 543, 553-54 (1987) (finding that in arbitration of
discharge cases, parties fared better with attorneys than without them,
particularly if the other side was unrepresented, but when both parties
proceeded pro se, arbitration awards did not differ significantly from cases in
which both parties were represented); Thomas L. Eovaldi & Peter R. Meyers,
The Pro Se Small Claims Court in Chicago: Justice for the "Little Guy"?, 72 Nw.
U. L. REV. 947, 987 tbl.VIII (1978) (when defendant was represented, plaintiff
won 68.8% of cases; when defendant proceeded pro se, plaintiff won 85.4% of
cases).
91. See I.R.C. § 7452 (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring IRS Chief Counsel or his
delegates to represent the IRS in all Tax Court actions); cf. Galanter, supra note
30, at 107 fig.1 (labeling the IRS as a "repeat player"). As a repeat player, the
IRS faces higher stakes. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
92. Cf Fromm, supra note 88, at 673 ("[Olpportunities for strategic
bargaining are enhanced if an attorney possesses more information about
settlement than his opposing counsel.").
93. For example, if an attorney discourages risk-seeking behavior by a
client who had viewed settlement offers as losses, the client may be willing to
make an offer to the IRS in a case when a pro se taxpayer would not, and this
might ultimately result in a better settlement outcome for the represented
taxpayer.
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Agency costs occasioned by the presence of attorneys could also
result in a better financial outcome of the case-at least in gross,
before attorneys' fees are considered. That is, if an attorney devotes
more time to a matter than a pro se taxpayer would (because of the
incentive that hours-based compensation provides), the attorney
may be better prepared for trial than a pro se taxpayer would be and
therefore obtain a better outcome for the client. Similarly, if an
attorney makes motions a pro se taxpayer might not make, that
might improve the outcome for the taxpayer by limiting the issues in
the case, for example.94 The flip side of this is the transaction cost of
attorney time, which may lead clients to try to cabin attorneys'
efforts.
The results of the analysis of the effect of attorneys on trial
outcomes are reported in Table 1.95 The Attorney variable is the
principal focus of the analysis. Its estimated coefficient shows the
direction and magnitude of any effect on the outcome of the presence
of an attorney for the taxpayer, and its p-value shows whether the
result is statistically significant. The financial outcome of a Tax
Court case is the amount of the tax "deficiency" (essentially, the
amount of tax understated) , or, occasionally, the amount the
94. A study of the effect of representation on non-adversary disability
hearings found that attorneys were more likely to make use of procedural
opportunities, and that representation provided an advantage, but that the
advantage generally was not linked to use of the procedures studied. See
Popkin, supra note 7, at 1028-35.
95. As discussed in the Appendix, the study used multiple regression
analysis to isolate the effect of the presence of taxpayer counsel on the outcome
in question-here, the IRS's recovery ratio. The regressions generally use the
statistical technique of Ordinary Least Squares, which assumes a linear
relationship between the outcome examined and the explanatory variables
included in the equation. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. Table 1
shows the variables included in the regression; the coefficient of each variable,
which reflects the direction and magnitude of the effect of that variable, and the
"p-value" for each variable's coefficient, which represents the probability that
the relationship of the particular variable to the outcome under consideration is
a chance result. A p-value of 0.05 or less (that is, the result occurs by chance
five percent or less of the time) is considered statistically significant. See Kevin
M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary, Xenophilia in American
Courts, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1120, 1127 n.17 (1996). For a typical null hypothesis
that the coefficient is equal to zero, a p-value of 0.05 indicates that the ninety-
five percent confidence interval (1 minus 0.05) for the coefficient does not
include zero. The smaller the p-value, the less likely it is that the observed
relationship occurred by chance.
96. The Internal Revenue Code defines a deficiency as the amount by which
the tax imposed exceeds an amount equal to (1) the amount of tax shown on the
taxpayer's return (if a return showing an amount of tax was filed) plus (2) any
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taxpayer overpaid.9 7  To quantify and compare the results across
cases, we look at the IRS's recovery ratio-the percentage of the
amount at stake that the IRS recovered.
The first column of Table 1 shows, in the left hand column, in
bold type, that, in tried cases, the presence of an attorney for the
taxpayer reduces the IRS's recovery ratio by 17.9 percentage points,
controlling for the other variables in the equation, and that this
result is highly statistically significant-the probability that the
result occurred by chance is less than 1%." This means, for
example, that if the IRS would otherwise have recovered 78% of the
amount of tax it claimed was due, representation would lower that
amount, on average, to about 60%. Put another way, in a tried case
with the mean amount at stake-2,979,117 99-for example, hiring
an attorney would save the taxpayer an average of $533,262 in tax
liability!
As further explained in the Appendix, the other variables
included in the regression (listed below the Attorney variable in the
Tables) control for the type of taxpayer involved in the case
(individual, estate, or corporation); whether or not more than one
judge was assigned to the case; 100 whether or not the IRS asserted a
deficiencies previously assessed or collected minus (3) any tax rebates made to
the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 6211(a) (LexisNexis 2006). In a typical situation, that
amounts to the difference between the tax liability the taxpayer reported and
the amount of tax actually due. Lederman, supra note 19, at 185 n. 14.
97. In general, when a case is in Tax Court with respect to a tax deficiency
asserted by the IRS, the Tax Court may consider an overpayment claim by the
taxpayer with respect to the same tax and tax period, subject to applicable
statutes of limitations. See I.R.C. § 6512(b) (LexisNexis 2006).
98. The Attorney coefficient is significant at the 0.01 confidence level. The
other significant coefficients are those for (1) the amount at stake, (2) whether
or not a penalty was asserted, and (3) the dummy variable taking on the value
of one for cases where the trial state is different from the state of the taxpayer's
residence at the time the petition was filed. As discussed in the Appendix, see
infra note 181, some of the regressions included a variable reflecting whether or
not the case had been through the IRS Appeals Office before it was docketed in
Tax Court. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL §
8.1.1.3(1) (2006) ("Appeals is the Internal Revenue Service's dispute resolution
forum. The Commissioner has granted Appeals authority to consider and
negotiate settlements of internal revenue controversies."). If the taxpayer has
not had an Appeals Conference prior to petitioning the Tax Court, the Tax
Court typically will send the case to the IRS Appeals Office to discuss possible
settlement. See Rev. Proc. 87-24, 1987-1 C.B. 720. When the Appeals variable
was added to this regression, the Attorney coefficient became -0.197, with a p-
value of 0.002. Appeals had a coefficient of 0.031 and a p-value of 0.640.
99. See infra Appendix, at Table 7.
100. All Tax Court trials are bench trials. See Lederman, supra note 13, at
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penalty; the number of tax years in issue in the case; the amount at
stake; the complexity of the case (using as a proxy the net number of
docket entries in the case); the year in which the case was filed; the
IRS region in which the city assigned for trial was located; and
whether the state selected for trial differed from the taxpayer's state
of residence.'0 ' As explained in the Appendix, the "Selection
Correction" regressions on the right side of Table 1 and subsequent
tables show the effect of controlling for the "selection effect" that
results because cases do not randomly settle or go to trial. 10 2 In all of
the regressions, we found that this selection effect did not bias the
Ordinary Least Squares results.11
3
330.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 193-201.
102. The variables included in the first-stage selection regression, but
excluded from the second stage of the Selection Correction regression in this
table and subsequent tables are the following judge characteristics: a dummy
variable reflecting whether or not the principal judge assigned to the case was a
Special Trial Judge; dummy variables reflecting the decade of the judge's
appointment to the Tax Court; and a dummy variable showing whether the
judge had any background in the private sector.
103. The insignificant lambda coefficient in the second column of Table 1
suggests that this selection effect does not bias the Ordinary Least Squares
("OLS") results. See infra note 208. In addition, the results of the selection
correction regression are similar to the OLS results. In particular, the presence
of an attorney reduces the recovery ratio by 18.7 percentage points and the
Attorney coefficient is significant at the 0.01 confidence level.
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Table 1: Effect of Attorney Representation on
IRS Recovery Ratio in Tried Cases
(1) Ordinary Least Squares (2) Selection Correction
Constant
Attorney
Individual'
Estate
More than One Judi
Any Penalty
Tax Years in Issue
Log(100+Stakes)
# Net Docket Entrie
Year=1990"
Year=1991
Year=1992
Year=1993
Year=1994
Central"
Mid-Atlantic
Mid-West
North-Atlantic
South-East
South-West
Trial State Differs
from Residence Stat
Coefficient p-value
1.380 0.0001*
-0.179 0.002*
-0.142 0.216
-0.381 0.128
,e 0.033 0.673
0.228 0.001*
-0.009 0.467
-0.048 0.010**
s -0.001 0.648
0.028 0.710
-0.022 0.820
0.049 0.590
0.039 0.677
-0.114 0.448
-0.097 0.321
-0.120 0.277
-0.099 0.270
-0.050 0.653
-0.083 0.406
-0.110 0.229
0.163 0.022**
(
Constant
Attorney
Individual'
Estate
More than One Judge
Any Penalty
Tax Years in Issue
Log(100+Stakes)
# Net Docket Entries
Year=1990"
Year=1991
Year=1992
Year=1993
Year=1994
Central..
Mid-Atlantic
Mid-West
North-Atlantic
South-East
South-West
Trial State Differs
from Residence State
Lambda
.oefficient
1.335
-0.187
-0.126
-0.394
0.017
0.217
-0.006
-0.049
-0.0002
0.028
-0.023
0.026
0.015
-0.134
-0.086
-0.108
-0.099
-0.057
-0.083
-0.117
0.168
Number of Observations = 189
Omitted group for taxpayer type is Corporation.
"Omitted group for year of filing is pre-1990.
"* Omitted group for region is West.
*p <0.01
** p < 0.05
It is consistent with intuition (and good news for lawyers) that
represented taxpayers achieve better outcomes in Tax Court trials
than unrepresented taxpayers do. 10 4 The result is also consistent
104. Because cases involving tax protestors might be idiosyncratic, for tried
cases we created a dummy variable that reflected whether or not the case
involved a tax protestor; tax protestors were assumed not to settle. Cases in
which the opinion reflected arguments the court deemed frivolous or arguments
that reflected an objection to the entire tax system or the imposition of any
taxes on the individual were listed as tax protestor cases, even if the objection
appeared to be made in good faith. We found twenty-two cases involving tax
protestors in the sample used in the recovery ratio at trial regressions. The
results were similar for the subsample that excluded those cases identified as
1257
p-value
0.0001*
0.003*
0.243
0.013**
0.822
0.001*
0.675
0.002*
0.905
0.710
0.795
0.785
0.886
0.395
0.340
0.271
0.331
0.584
0.376
0.169
0.012**
0.071 0.480
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with Professor Herbert Kritzer's study of Wisconsin Tax Appeals
Commission hearings. Kritzer found that attorneys succeeded in
reversing the Wisconsin Department of Revenue's determination in
thirty-six percent of the cases, while unrepresented taxpayers were
similarly successful in only twenty percent of the cases.' °5
involving a tax protestor. In particular, the same variables remained
significant at the 0.05 level, and with similar coefficients, as Table la shows.
Table la: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for IRS Recovery
Ratio in Tried Cases, Excluding Tax Protestors from the Sample
Coefficient p-value
Constant 1.329 0.0001*
Attorney 
-0.140 0.036**
Individual' -0.130 0.266
Estate -0.379 0.137
More than One Judge 0.029 0.745
Any Penalty 0.225 0.003*
Tax Years in Issue -0.016 0.229
Log(100+Stakes) 
-0.047 0.019**
# Net Docket Entries -0.001 0.676
Year=1990" 0.039 0.640
Year=1991 -0.009 0.931
Year=1992 0.052 0.612
Year=1993 0.051 0.644
Year=1994 -0.139 0.418
Central"' -0.119 0.267
Mid-Atlantic -0.111 0.368
Mid-West -0.087 0.391
North-Atlantic 
-0.044 0.719
South-East 
-0.041 0.710
South-West -0.117 0.253
Trial State Differs from Residence State 0.180 0.017"*
Number of Observations = 167 * p < 0.01
'Omitted group for taxpayer type is Corporation. * p < 0.05
"Omitted group for year of filing is pre-1990.
Omitted group for region is West.
Because the results were very similar whether or not the tax protestors were
included and the sample is larger when they are included, they were kept in the
sample.
105. KRITZER, supra note 6, at 83. In Kritzer's study, there was a mixed
outcome (partial win) in 27% of the attorneys' cases and 17% of unrepresented
cases. Id. at 83 tbl.10. This result is also consistent with a meta-analysis of
lawyers' effects on trial and hearing outcomes. See Rebecca L. Sandefur,
Lawyer, Non-Lawyer, and Pro Se Representation and Trial and Hearing
Outcomes (2006) (unpublished manuscript at 18, on file with authors); cf.
Galanter, supra note 30, at 114 n.45 (citing prior research on the value
attorneys add).
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Nonetheless, because lawyers were not randomly assigned to
some cases and not others, it is possible that attorneys appeared
disproportionately in cases in which taxpayers already had a better
shot (or, conversely, in cases that were weaker for taxpayers). In
order to try to disentangle the effect of the presence of an attorney
from any difference in the type of case in which the taxpayer is
represented, we used Tax Protestor as an instrumental variable in a
Two-Stage Least Squares regression. Being a tax protestor was
correlated with pro se status but was not directly correlated with the
outcome of the case. 1°6  Using Tax Protestor as an instrument
therefore allowed us to calculate a coefficient for the Attorney
variable that adjusts for possible non-random hiring of attorneys.
Table 2 compares the results of the Attorney variable in the
Ordinary Least Squares regression with the Two-Stage Least
Squares regression.
1
0
7
Table 2: Effect of Representation on IRS Recovery Ratio in
Tried Cases, Controlling for Non-Random Attorney Hiring
(1) Ordinary Least Squares (2) Two-Stage Least Squares'
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Attorney" -0.179 0.002* Attorney -0.351 0.001*
Number of Observations = 189 * p < 0.01
Instrumental Variable is Tax Protestor.
tt Other variables not presented to conserve space.
What the results shown in Table 2 suggest is that the effect of
the presence of counsel (the Attorney variable) is actually almost
twice as large as the Ordinary Least Squares regressions indicate.
The coefficient in the Two-Stage Least Squares regression reflects a
decrease by 35.1 percentage points in the IRS's recovery ratio, as
opposed to 17.9 percentage points, and remains statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. These results suggest that, if anything,
the effect of an attorney on the IRS's recovery in tried cases is likely
106. See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
107. The other variables present in Table 1 were included in the regressions
presented in Table 2, but are not listed, to conserve space. The complete results
for the OLS regression are in Table 1 and the complete results for the Two-
Stage Least Squares ("2SLS") regression appear in Table 8, which is in the
Appendix. The 2SLS procedure is explained in the Appendix. See infra text
accompanying notes 212-16.
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to be greater than the Ordinary Least Squares regression shows-
an average tax reduction, in the mean litigated case, of $1,045,670
rather than $533,262.08
In addition, the attorney's level of experience appears to have
influenced the IRS's recovery ratio in tried cases. Table 3 shows the
results when the continuous variable "Attorney's Years of
Experience" was substituted for the Attorney variable, where the
outcome examined remained the IRS's recovery ratio in tried109
cases. Table 3 shows that each additional year of attorney
experience decreases the IRS's recovery ratio by approximately 9/10
of a percentage point, and this is statistically significant."1  In
addition, the Two-Stage Least Squares results for Attorney
Experience also show an effect larger in magnitude than found in
the Ordinary Least Squares regression. In the Two-Stage Least
Squares regression, each additional year of attorney experience
decreases the IRS's recovery ratio by approximately 2.7 percentage
points. Overall, the Attorney Experience results suggest that some
combination of attorneys' greater expertise, experience, and
familiarity with the Tax Court and its judges improves the outcome
for the taxpayer.
108. See supra text accompanying note 99.
109. There is a slightly smaller sample of cases using the Years of Attorney
Experience variable than the Attorney variable-165 cases in the regression for
IRS's recovery ratio in tried cases-because there were a few attorneys whose
experience we could not ascertain. When attorney experience was divided into
categories for pro se, zero to ten years of attorney experience, more than ten
years of experience but no more than twenty, more than twenty years of
experience but no more than thirty, and over thirty years of experience, with
pro se as the excluded category, the coefficients in the OLS regressions were
-0.18, -0.18, -0.26, and -0.31, respectively, for each of the four groups. The
p-values were 0.089, 0.032, 0.011, and 0.035, respectively.
110. In the comparable regression using the sample of 143 observations that
excluded the cases identified as involving a tax protestor, the coefficient was
-0.007 and the p-value was 0.027.
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Table 3: Effect of Attorney Experience on
IRS Recovery Ratio in Tried Cases'
(1) Ordinary Least Squares (2) Two-Stage Least Squares*
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Attorney's -0.009 0.006* Attorney's -0.027 0.006*
Years of Years of
Experience Experience
Number of Observations = 165 * p < 0.01
'Variables other than Attorney's Years of Experience not presented to conserve space.
Observations with missing values for Attorney's Years of Experience were deleted from
the sample. Tax Protestors are included in the sample.
Instrumental Variable is Tax Protestor.
Thus, the recovery ratio results suggest that both the presence
of counsel and the experience of counsel have significant effects on
the financial outcome of cases. In addition, that effect may be larger
in magnitude than initially evident from the results of the Ordinary
Least Squares regression because taxpayers do not randomly make
the decision to hire an attorney. The Two-Stage Least Squares
results quite logically suggest that taxpayers tend to hire counsel in
cases that are weaker overall, which, in the Ordinary Least Squares
regression, results in an understatement of the magnitude of
attorneys' actual improvement in taxpayers' financial outcomes.
B. Attorneys' Effects on Settlement Amounts
With one exception, the characteristics that distinguish
attorney representation from unrepresented litigants generally,
such as expertise, experience, and agency issues, should have a
positive effect on outcomes in settled cases,"' for the same reasons
as in tried cases, discussed above."' 2 That is, expertise, experience,
an incentive to devote substantial time to the case, and objectivity
should all tend to improve settlement outcomes. The exception is
that represented litigants, who generally are paying their Tax Court
111. Cf Watts, supra note 88, at 169 ("[Tlhe attorney may be a tougher
bargainer than the client, as in Meurer (1992) .... [T]he attorney may [also] be
an expert who can uncover part of the information concerning the [defendant's]
negligence at a fraction of its value .... [Tihis information can be used in the
bargaining process to provide a more profitable settlement for the client.")
(referring to Michael J. Meurer, The Gains from Faith in an Unfaithful Agent:
Settlement Conflicts Between Defendants and Liability Insurers, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 502 (1992)).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 87-94.
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counsel by the hour, may be less patient in waiting for settlement
opportunities because they incur transaction costs pro se litigants do
not.11 3  That might reduce the settlement amounts represented
taxpayers receive, assuming that better settlement opportunities
become available later in the litigation, which may be the case.
1 14
Thus, theory is somewhat ambiguous as to what effects attorneys
might have on settlement outcomes.
The data suggest that attorneys do not actually influence
settlement outcomes one way or the other. Table 4 reports the
results. The first column of Table 4 shows the Ordinary Least
Squares results; the Attorney coefficient is negative but it is small
and not statistically significant. 115 The second column of Table 4
presents the Selection Correction results, which are very similar to
the Ordinary Least Squares results."6
113. See supra text accompanying note 54. The situation in a contingency
fee case is distinct from the context analyzed here. Contingency fee
arrangements, depending on how they are structured, can give rise to incentives
for attorneys to settle for amounts that do not maximize the award to the client.
See Thomason, supra note 51, at 206, 221-22 (finding, in an empirical study of a
context involving "regulated contingent fees," consistent with the notion that
contingent fees can give rise to a conflict of interest, that "the results ...
indicate that workers' compensation claimants who are represented by
attorneys receive smaller settlements than do claimants not represented by
counsel.").
114. See Rhee, supra note 51, at 53 (under asset pricing model of litigation,
early settlements should be lower in amount than later ones).
115. When the Appeals variable, which is discussed in notes 98 and 181, was
added to the regression, the Attorney coefficient became -0.021, with a p-value
of 0.760. Appeals had a coefficient of -0.001 and a p-value of 0.992.
116. The lambda coefficient is again insignificant, suggesting that the
Ordinary Least Squares results are not biased. See supra note 103; infra note
208.
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Table 4: Regression Results Showing Effect of Attorney
Representation on IRS Recovery Ratio in Settled Cases
(1) Ordinary Least Squares
Coefficient
Constant 0.573
Attorney -0.010
Individual' -0.079
Estate -0.044
More than One Judge 0.078
Any Penalty -0.003
Tax Years in Issue 0.085
Log(100+Stakes) -0.027
# Net Docket Entries -0.001
Year=1990" -0.138
Year=1991 -0.074
Year=1992 -0.119
Year=1993 -0.083
Year=1994 -0.111
Central t  0.202
Mid-Atlantic 0.057
Mid-West 0.020
North-Atlantic 0.060
South-East 0.128
South-West 0.126
Trial State Differs -0.109
from Residence State
p-value
0.011**
0.876
0.391
0.730
0.501
0.975
0.005*
0.119
0.749
0.301
0.498
0.225
0.393
0.246
0.027**
0.513
0.823
0.494
0.156
0.086
0.122
(2) Selection Correction
Coefficient
Constant 0.666
Attorney -0.033
Individuaf -0.063
Estate -0.055
More than One Judge 0.046
Any Penalty -0.038
Tax Years in Issue 0.091
Log(100+Stakes) -0.034
# Net Docket Entries 0.008
Year=1990" -0.123
Year=1991 -0.090
Year=1992 -0.148
Year=1993 -0.123
Year=1994 -0.142
Centrafl- 0.242
Mid-Atlantic 0.116
Mid-West 0.031
North-Atlantic 0.063
South-East 0.122
South-West 0.118
Trial State Differs -0.104
from Residence State
Lambda
Number of Observations = 197
Omitted group for taxpayer type is Corporation.
Omitted group for year of filing is pre-1990.
, Omitted group for region is West.
-0.152 0.389
*p < 0.01
p < 0.05
C. Why Do Attorneys Improve Financial Outcomes in Tried but Not
Settled Tax Court Cases?
The regression results discussed supra in Part II.B suggest that
taxpayer representatives obtain better outcomes than
unrepresented taxpayers do in cases that go to trial, implying that
taxpayers' attorneys assist their clients in making their cases to Tax
Court judges. Unrepresented taxpayers may fail to present evidence
necessary to prove a required element in a complex section of the
Internal Revenue Code, for example.
Familiarity with Tax Court procedures may be particularly
important. Professor Kritzer emphasized the importance of
procedure following his observation of nonlawyer representatives
1263
p-value
0.005*
0.628
0.472
0.649
0.619
0.637
0.001*
0.079
0.497
0.239
0.366
0.105
0.186
0.228
0.026**
0.487
0.745
0.464
0.149
0.097
0.131
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advocating on behalf of clients in hearings of the Wisconsin Tax
Appeals Commission:
While I saw relatively few hearings, both my observations and
the quantitative data I collected presented a stark pattern ....
[T]he nonlawyer specialists I observed at tax hearings were,
with one possible exception, not effective in the hearing
context. . . . The nonlawyers whom I saw may have had
extensive substantive knowledge; what they lacked was any
sense of the procedural elements of the hearing setting.
Therefore, the hearings involving nonlawyer advocates more
closely resembled hearings where the taxpayer was
unrepresented than hearings where a tax lawyer appeared for
the taxpayer.
1 17
Counsel who frequently litigate in Tax Court also become
familiar with the judges' behavior and expectations. They may
therefore have a better idea of what the judges find persuasive, and
develop credibility with the judges.118 Thus, the results, particularly
the significance of attorney experience, support the notion that the
expertise and experience of attorneys has an important effect on the
financial outcome of litigated cases.
The lack of any statistically significant effect of counsel on the
IRS's recovery ratio in settled cases contrasts with the results in
tried cases, and suggests that counsel do not obtain better
settlements than pro se taxpayers do. This result is initially
counterintuitive in that it suggests that counsel add no value in Tax
Court cases that settle.
These results may reflect the possibility that the same
specialized training critical for making a case in court is not
required for negotiations, even for negotiating with the IRS."19
117. KRITZER, supra note 6, at 80.
118. See Haire et al., supra note 29, at 672 ("More experienced litigators
before a particular court may have reputations for veracity in factual
presentations, so that judges come to 'trust' particular attorneys more than
others.").
119. Importantly, "[elvidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is ... not admissible [to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim
or its amount]." FED. R. EVID. 408. The common law rule was not so sweeping
and thereby made settlement negotiations risky for non-experts:
[T]he common law rule did not exclude evidence of admissions of fact
made in the course of compromise negotiations, unless hypothetical in
form or stated to be without prejudice. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 274
(2nd ed. 1972). . . . The particularized treatment accorded by the
common law to factual admissions made hypothetically or without
prejudice was.., believed to constitute an unwarranted preference for
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Taxpayers may have previous negotiation experience, including
experience negotiating with the IRS prior to the docketing of the
case in Tax Court.12  In addition, IRS attorneys may attempt to
assist pro se taxpayers by focusing them on the critical issues, for
example. IRS attorneys may also value cases based on their
experiences with taxpayer counsel and not adjust their estimates if
the taxpayer is pro se (perhaps lacking a reason or incentive to do
SO). 121
By contrast, if the case is tried by a Tax Court judge, the
Federal Rules of Evidence and Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure apply.1 2   Unrepresented litigants, in Tax Court and
elsewhere, may have a very difficult time navigating the procedural
rules and properly marshaling the evidence required to make a
the sophisticated and correspondingly a trap for the unwary.
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 408 app. 01 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d
ed. 2006) (emphasis added). Given Federal Rule of Evidence 408, settlement
negotiations generally no longer require that kind of specialized expertise.
120. Interestingly, we found that each additional case the same taxpayer
was involved in for the period covered by the Tax Court's docket inquiry system
reduced the IRS's recovery ratio in settled cases by 5.2 percentage points. This
result was nearly significant at the 0.05 level; its p-value was 0.058. The result
holds for both pro se and represented cases; the coefficient of an interaction
term of represented cases and the number of cases variable was small and
insignificant.
121. Unrepresented taxpayers negotiating with the IRS might even threaten
to hire counsel if the case does not settle, and that threat should be credible if it
is made sufficiently in advance of trial and there is enough at stake to justify
the payment of legal fees. It is also possible that attorneys do in fact obtain
better settlement outcomes for their clients, but that it is not evident because of
the lack of a way to address in the settled subsample non-random hiring of
attorneys. A study by H. Laurence Ross of insurance payments to victims of car
accidents (about ninety-five percent of which were resolved by settlement) found
that:
Although some of this apparent advantage is spurious-related to the
kind of claims that attorneys agree to represent-the fact remains
that at every level of damages and liability, the outcome in a
represented case is likely to be more favorable to the claimant than
that in an unrepresented case.
H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAiMS ADJUSTMENTS 141, 194 (1970). Ross asserts that "I believe that a good
part of the discrepancy between the amounts received by represented and
unrepresented claimants stems from the deficiency of the latter in negotiation
skills." Id. at 168. He specifically points to different behavior insurance claims
adjusters may use with unrepresented claimants that change the nature of the
"game." See id. at 168-69.
122. I.R.C. § 7453 (LexisNexis 2006). Small tax cases, which follow more
informal procedures, were not included in this study. See infra note 180.
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persuasive case. 123  For example, a recent newspaper article
explaining the difficulties of pro se litigation in an employment
discrimination case points out aspects of the litigation in which the
unrepresented plaintiff was unsuccessful, including her attempts to
have admitted into evidence a videotape and a document listing her
job responsibilities.1 2 4  Accordingly, in formal court proceedings,
there may be little substitute for the presence of an attorney,
particularly a seasoned one, because of the importance of procedural
expertise.1
25
Thus, taken together, the results of the analysis of taxpayer
attorneys' influences on the financial outcome of Tax Court cases
suggest that where attorneys add the most value is where there is
little substitute for their expertise and experience. Institutional
features present in Tax Court litigation, particularly the lack of an
incentive on the part of the IRS and its government attorney to
extract as much money as possible in every case, may also be
reflected in the lack of a statistically significant effect of taxpayer
counsel on settlement results.
126
123. See KRITZER, supra note 6, at 80. Tax Court Judge David Laro has
commented, "most pro se taxpayers do not adequately know the Tax Court
Rules or the Federal Rules of Evidence and are thus handicapped in the
courtroom." Laro, supra note 26, at 26-27. Rebecca Sandefur's meta-analysis of
lawyers' effects on trial and hearing outcomes found "a strong, positive
relationship between the procedural complexity of the field of law and lawyer
advantage." Sandefur, supra note 105 (manuscript at 17, 18).
124. Kara Scannell, In Phoenix Court, Sales Rep Battles Aventis on Her
Own, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2005, at Al; see also Sandefur, supra note 105
(manuscript at 19) (describing types of fundamental errors unrepresented
parties make).
125. Cf Haire et al., supra note 29, at 683 (finding support for "the
proposition that advocates' process expertise plays an important role in judicial
decisionmaking").
126. Interestingly, a study of administrative hearings in Aid to Families
with Dependent Children ("AFDC") cases found that "clients with attorneys
appeared to be more successful at hearings, whereas self-represented clients
were often successful through negotiations with the agency." Ronald P.
Hammer & Joseph M. Hartley, Special Student Project, Procedural Due Process
and the Welfare Recipient: A Statistical Study of AFDC Fair Hearings in
Wisconsin, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 145, 223-24; see also id. at 244. The context of the
AFDC hearings is not completely analogous to Tax Court cases, however,
because the hearings do not follow formal judicial procedures, such as the use of
rules of evidence. See id. at 225.
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III. THE EFFECTS OF ATTORNEYS ON TIME TO CASE RESOLUTION
Part II examined the effect of attorneys on the financial
outcome of Tax Court cases. The effects attorneys have on the
timing of settlements and trials is also an important question, as
"[t]he time it takes to resolve a dispute is an important indicator of
how well the civil justice system is working."127 The presence of
attorneys may affect the timing of trials or settlements 12 as a result
127. Thomas A. Eaton et al., Another Brick in the Wall: An Empirical Look
at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 GA. L. REV. 1049, 1080 (2000).
128. At least two studies of insurance payments to automobile accident
victims found that the presence of an attorney was associated with a greater
number of days until final payment. See JAMES K. HAMMITT, AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION VOL. II: PAYMENTS BY AUTO INSURERS 62-67 (1985);
JOHN E. ROLPH ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION VOL. I: WHO PAYS
How MUCH How SOON? 24-25 (1985); Ross, supra note 121, at 228-29.
However, "[t]he presence of an attorney is probably in part a proxy for the
complexity of the case," ROLPH ET AL., supra, at 24, or may reflect a
disproportionate representation of cases involving large damage amounts, Ross,
supra note 121, at 229. Attorneys may also handle cases in a manner different
than unrepresented claimants do. HAMMITT, supra, at 66; cf ROSS, supra note
121, at 229. Attorney representation in these cases differs from that in Tax
Court cases because the compensation to a plaintiffs attorney in an automobile
accident case generally is based on a contingency fee. See HAMMITF, supra, at
66 ("[LIegal fees are typically about one-third of the final recovery.").
Contingency fee-based compensation may affect the timing of settlement in
different ways than hours-based compensation does. See, e.g., Eric Helland &
Alexander Tabarrok, Contingency Fees, Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality
Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 517,
537 (2003) (finding, in their analysis of two state-courts data sets, "that the
time to settlement is 21% longer in cases that are contingency fee limited");
infra note 160; cf Neil Rickman, Contingent Fees and Litigation Settlement, 19
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 295, 305 (1999) (arguing that the view that contingent
fees encourage attorneys to agree to early, low settlements is overly simplistic
because contingency fees may facilitate credible "hard bargaining" that results
in "ambiguity in settlement timing . . . because bargaining harder involves
rejecting more low-damage offers as well as inducing more (acceptable) high-
damage ones").
Several studies of the effect on disposition time of tenant representation in
eviction cases found that the presence of a lawyer for the tenant increases
disposition time. See, e.g., Karl Monsma & Richard Lempert, The Value of
Counsel: 20 Years of Representation Before a Public Housing Eviction Board, 26
LAw & Soc'Y REV. 627, 654-55 (1992) (studying cases before housing board in
Oahu, Hawaii); Steven Gunn, Note, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly
Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 YALE L. & POLY REV. 385, 415 (1995)
(studying cases in housing court in New Haven, Connecticut). In this context,
timing may be part of the substantive outcome of the case because delay in
eviction from housing can be beneficial for tenants; it may allow them "to save
money for, and move safely into, new housing." Gunn, supra, at 385; see also id.
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of the features, discussed supra in Part I, that attorneys may bring
to litigation that pro se litigants generally do not-expertise, repeat
play, agency costs, transaction costs, and reduction of cognitive
biases.
129
Of course, the average length of time to settlement is unlikely to
be the same as the average length of time to trial.3 ° In particular,
because cases settle much more frequently before trial than after
trial,13 1 time to trial generally would be longer than time to
settlement. Time to trial and time to settlement are therefore each
considered separately, below.
A. Attorneys' Influence on Time to Trial
Once a case is filed, the time elapsed until trial depends, in the
first instance, on the date set for trial. The court's procedures for
setting trial dates, the volume of its caseload, and aspects of the
case, such as its complexity, may be a large determining factor of the
initial trial date.
In Tax Court cases, the taxpayer plays an important role in the
determination of the trial date. When the taxpayer initiates the
at 415; Monsma & Lempert, supra, at 654. Most of the representatives for
represented tenants in these studies were employed by legal aid organizations.
See Gunn, supra, at 391-92 (all represented tenants in the study were
represented by legal services attorneys); Monsma & Lempert, supra, at 631-32
(most of the represented tenants were represented by legal aid attorneys or
paralegals supervised by legal aid attorneys). Tenants represented by legal
services organizations generally do not bear the financial costs of their
representation. See John Bolton & Stephen Holzer, Note, Legal Services and
Landlord-Tenant Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 82 YALE L.J. 1495, 1499
(1973). The Bolton & Holzer study found that landlord-tenant cases involving
legal services attorneys took longer to resolve than cases involving private
attorneys, primarily because of legal aid attorneys' "use of the procedural
complexities available in summary process litigation." Id. at 1497-98 (studying
evictions in New Haven, Connecticut) (footnote omitted). But cf Gunn, supra,
at 387-88 (criticizing some of the methodology of the Bolton & Holzer study).
The Monsma & Lempert article states that "it appears that lawyers delay
eviction decisions because they tend to act like lawyers, and even informal
tribunals may allow them to act this way." Monsma & Lempert, supra, at 654-
55.
129. Attorneys may also affect litigation by their mere presence. For
example, where a party has the option to proceed pro se, hiring an attorney
might serve as a signal that might influence the timing of the resolution of the
case.
130. We used time to trial rather than time to decision because the time
between trial and decision should largely be in control of the judge and
therefore less influenced by the parties or their counsel.
131. See Irvine, supra note 13, at 341 ("Nearly 95% of all federal civil cases
will settle before trial, leaving less than five percent of civil cases to be
appealed.") (footnotes omitted).
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litigation by filing a petition opposing the IRS's determination of a
tax deficiency, 132 the taxpayer generally simultaneously designates a
location for trial'33 because, although the Tax Court is based in
Washington, D.C., it hears cases in numerous cities around the
country.1 3 ' Because the court only sits in most cities a few times a
year, 3 1 the location the taxpayer selects for trial likely will affect the
trial date.
Once an initial trial date is set, postponement of that date
should depend on the extent to which the court grants continuances
and the length of those continuances. 3 6 Thus, if pro se litigants tend
to obtain more (or fewer) continuances than represented litigants or
if they obtain continuances that are longer (or shorter) on average,
representation would influence time to trial.
Attorneys' training might suggest greater success in obtaining
continuances they seek. Similarly, the expertise and credibility
derived from repeat appearances in the court should increase their
success rate. However, experience might also lead attorneys to
request fewer continuances because continuances are not routinely
granted. 37 An agency cost analysis suggests that attorneys might
seek continuances so as to put more time into preparing for trial;
clients, who bear those transaction costs, would try to constrain
that.
132. See I.R.C. § 6213 (LexisNexis 2006); supra note 15.
133. See TAx CT. R. PRAc. & PROC. 20(a) (commencement of Tax Court case),
140(a) ("The petitioner, at the time of filing the petition, shall file a designation
of place of trial showing the place at which the petitioner would prefer the trial
to be held. If the petitioner has not filed such designation, the Commissioner,
at the time the answer is filed, shall file a designation showing the place of trial
preferred by the Commissioner."). The Tax Court places the case on a trial
calendar once the case is "at issue." Id. R. 131(a). Tax Court cases generally
are at issue after the IRS's answer is filed. See id. R. 38.
134. See id. at app. III (listing cities in which the Tax Court conducts trials).
135. See, e.g., United States Tax Court Fall Session Calendar,
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/courtschedules/Fall_2006Term_%20final.pdf (last
visited Oct. 3, 2006) (displaying the Tax Court city rotation for the 2006 Fall
Session).
136. In Tax Court:
A case or matter scheduled on a calendar may be continued by the
Court upon motion or at its own initiative. A motion for continuance
shall inform the Court of the position of the other parties with respect
thereto, either by endorsement thereon by the other parties or by a
representation of the moving party.
TAx CT. R. PRAC. & PROC. 133.
137. See id. ("Continuances will be granted only in exceptional
circumstances.").
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On the other hand, some litigants might seek continuances as a
stalling tactic because, in Tax Court, the tax ultimately determined
or agreed to be due does not need to be paid until the case is
resolved.138  Attorneys might help quell that impulse because, as
agents rather than principals, they themselves are not liable to the
IRS and have greater objectivity.
Thus, theory does not unambiguously predict whether the time
elapsed to trial will generally be longer or shorter for represented
taxpayers. Table 5 reports the results of the Ordinary Least
Squares regression that tested the relationship between the
presence of an attorney and time to trial. As the Ordinary Least
Squares coefficient for the presence of an attorney shows (in the first
column of Table 5), the presence of an attorney increased the time to
trial by a bit more than two months.89 However, the coefficient is
not statistically significant. The Selection Correction results in the
second column of Table 5 suggest that the results are not biased by
the non-random selection of cases for trial.' 40  Thus, empirical
analysis of this question suggests that the presence of an attorney
for the taxpayer has no significant effect on the time elapsed
between filing and trial.
138. See Howard A. Dawson, Jr., Should the Federal Civil Tax Litigation
System Be Restructured?, 40 TAx NOTES 1427, 1427 (1988). If the taxpayer does
not pay the tax or post a deposit, he or she will owe interest to the government
on any amount ultimately determined to be due. See I.R.C. §§ 6601, 6621
(LexisNexis 2006).
139. That is, 19.2% of a year. When the Appeals variable, which is discussed
in notes 98 and 181, was added to the regression, the Attorney coefficient
became 0.235, with a p-value of 0.095. Appeals had a coefficient of 0.070 and a
p-value of 0.674.
140. As discussed infra in note 208, the fact that the lambda coefficient is
not statistically significant indicates a lack of bias. The results are also very
similar to the OLS results; the principal changes from the OLS results are in p-
values of the variables relating to the year the case was filed.
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Table 5: Regression Results Showing Effect of Attorney
Representation on Time to Trial
(1) Ordinary Least Squares (2) Selection Correction
Constant
Attorney
Individuaf
Estate
More than One
Judge
Any Penalty
Tax Years in Issue
Log(100+Stakes)
# Net Docket
Entries
Year= 1990't
Year=1991
Year= 1992
Year=1993
Year=1994
Central''
Mid-Atlantic
Mid-West
North-Atlantic
South-East
South-West
Trial State Differs
oefficient p-value
-0.315 0.731
0.192 0.355
0.998 0.003*
0.619 0.090
1.071 0.003*
0.128
-0.055
0.022
0.033
-0.540
-0.329
-0.768
-0.808
-0.640
-0.033
-0.217
-0.066
0.022
0.368
0.235
0.166
0.514
0.192
0.785
0.001*
0.008*
0.047**
0.002*
0.002*
0.015**
0.885
0.608
0.831
0.929
0.367
0.399
0.485
from Residence State
Constant
Attorney
Individual'
Estate
More than One
Judge
Any Penalty
Tax Years in Issue
Log(100+Stakes)
# Net Docket
Entries
Year= 1990"
Year=1991
Year=1992
Year=1993
Year=1994
Central"'
Mid-Atlantic
Mid-West
North-Atlantic
South-East
South-West
Trial State Differs
from Residence Stat
Lambda
Coefficient p-value
-0.172 0.806
0.214 0.307
0.961 0.002*
0.635 0.126
1.132 0.0001*
0.163 0.426
-0.065 0.129
0.023 0.635
0.031 0.0001*
-0.537 0.026**
-0.336 0.201
-0.706 0.014**
-0.717 0.035**
-0.580 0.287
-0.067 0.815
-0.244 0.424
-0.072 0.826
0.039 0.905
0.355 0.205
0.247 0.344
0.160 0.442
e
-0.208 0.432
Number of observations = 161
Omitted group for taxpayer type is Corporation.
Omitted group for year of filing is pre-1990.
Omitted group for region is West.
*p < 0.01p < 0.05
1271
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
B. Attorneys' Influence on Time to Settlement
The parties should have greater control over the timing of
settlement than they do over the timing of trials because, by
definition, settlement requires the parties' agreement. However, the
timing of settlement is also likely correlated with trial dates.14 1 An
impending trial may create a "now or never" atmosphere in
settlement negotiations. 1
42
Parties may be more likely to settle later in the litigation than
earlier 4 3 for other reasons, as well. As the litigation advances,
parties typically obtain more information about the underlying facts
and the other party's case.'" Thus, uncertainty about the trial
outcome likely decreases as the case proceeds. 4 ' In addition,
litigants may delay settlement discussions in the hope that the other
side will initiate them because suggesting that the case settle may
141. See GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 78 n.23
(1983) ("In Phoenix, for example, we found that over 70% of all cases were
settled within 30 days of the trial date. Of those a hefty 13% settled on the day
of trial itself."); Coyne, supra note 22, at 367 ("Over my first ten years as a
lawyer handling civil litigation I noticed that in many of my cases the first
serious settlement discussions took place shortly before trial .... I found a
perplexing resistance to early settlement discussions-in opposing counsel, in
my clients, and in myself."); Macfarlane, supra note 62, at 666 ("[S]tatistics...
demonstrate consistently that settlement generally takes place some distance
into the life of a lawsuit, often on the courtroom steps."); Charles Thensted,
Litigation and Less: the Negotiation Alternative, 59 TuL. L. REV. 76, 94 (1984)
("Many attorneys purposefully do not address the prospect of settlement until
the eve of trial.").
142. See Joseph Latting, Don't Do It, 15 REV. LITIG. 387, 390 (1996) ("Like it
or not, parties often do not feel the pressure to settle until the trial date
approaches."). An experienced attorney may exploit that time pressure if the
opponent is less experienced "in order to take advantage of the other side's
expected reluctance to try the case. In this instance, the experienced lawyer
will rely on the pressure of time to obtain a more favorable result for his client."
Thensted, supra note 141, at 108; cf. Rickman, supra note 128, at 296
("Contingent fees may improve lawyers' incentives to bargain hard, thereby
raising settlement offers and, if high offers are forthcoming, speeding
settlement.").
143. Macfarlane, supra note 62, at 666.
144. See Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing
Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 182 (1990); John P. Gould, The Economics of
Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 287 (1973).
145. See Cornell, supra note 144, at 182; Gould, supra note 144, at 287;
Mark Klock, Financial Options, Real Options, and Legal Options: Opting to
Exploit Ourselves and What We Can Do About It, 55 ALA. L. REV. 63, 87-89
(2003).
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signal weakness. 146  Together, these factors suggest that more
settlements will occur later in the litigation process-and close to
the date set for trial-than earlier in the litigation.
The effects of the features characteristic of representation on
time to settlement do not clearly predict whether attorneys delay or
expedite settlement because some features suggest the possibility of
delays caused by representation and some suggest the opposite.
First, attorney expertise might expedite settlement. That is,
because attorneys generally are more familiar with litigation
procedure than pro se litigants are, they are less likely to make
mistakes that delay case resolution. For example, a represented
taxpayer is much less likely to arrive at a settlement conference
unprepared to negotiate or without critical documents. Similarly,
the Gilson and Mnookin notion that repeat play increases
cooperation suggests that represented taxpayers might, on average,
reach quicker settlements with the IRS.147
If attorneys reduce clients' cognitive biases, that also might
expedite settlement by mitigating factors that narrow the possible
settlement range-the overlap between the least the plaintiff will
accept and the most defendant will pay.1 4 For example, an attorney
might be able to temper a client's optimism bias. This could
expedite settlement by preventing the shrinking of the settlement
range that optimism bias occasions.4 9
146. See Thensted, supra note 141, at 105-06.
147. See Johnston & Waldfogel, supra note 24, at 40.
148. For example, if each party would pay $25,000 to litigate a $200,000
claim that the plaintiff has a fifty-percent chance of winning, the gross expected
value of the claim not considering the costs of litigation would be $100,000.
Once those costs are taken into account, though, plaintiff stands to gain only
$75,000 if she wins, and defendant stands to lose $125,000 if he loses. Any
settlement of more than $75,000 and less than $125,000, if made before those
costs of litigation are sacrificed, makes each party better off. Issacharoff, supra
note 60, at 1269. The $50,000 settlement range in this example (between
$75,000 and $125,000), not coincidentally, is the sum of the parties' litigation
costs. See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic
Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11 (1995). This is a very simple example that
assumes that the likelihood the plaintiff will win is known and that the
damages are fixed or known. Of course, real life generally is not that
straightforward. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING
THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 58-60 (1991) (discussing an
exampie similar uu tima1t u'uve, u IJpuLm ui uui UL uai u Luawc vauations and
transaction costs often are uncertain).
149. For example, if, in the example in note 148, the plaintiff believes that
he or she has a sixty-percent probability of winning the $200,000 stakes (rather
than a fifty-percent chance), the plaintiff expects a $120,000 return from trial
and will not settle for less than $95,000 (rather than $75,000). Similarly, if the
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In addition, attorneys-who are not themselves liable for the
taxes involved in the dispute-may help taxpayers approach
decisions from a more risk-neutral perspective. Unlike typical
plaintiffs, who stand to gain money from a settlement,' 50 taxpayers
in Tax Court cases are functional defendants151 who typically are
trying to minimize the amount owed. Thus, like defendants,
taxpayers may therefore view settlement possibilities as losses." 2
As discussed above,"' people generally are risk-averse in choosing
between options framed as "gains" but risk-seeking when choosing
between options framed as "losses," and, in addition, have a stronger
reaction to losses than to gains."4
Taxpayer litigants might therefore demonstrate risk-seeking
behavior, opting to forgo an early settlement-thereby risking the
possibility of trial-in the hope of obtaining a more favorable
settlement (or judgment, if the case in fact fails to settle). This
behavior may delay settlement in cases that settle. Attorneys could
temper risk-seeking behavior on the part of taxpayer litigants,
perhaps by overstating the risk involved."' That could expedite
settlement if it results in the acceptance of an earlier settlement
offer. Similarly, an attorney might be able to reframe as a gain an
defendant believes that the plaintiff has only a forty-percent probability of
winning, the defendant expects to pay $80,000 after trial and will not pay more
than $105,000 (rather than $125,000). These optimistic estimates of the
outcome at trial narrowed the settlement range from $50,000 in the example in
note 146 to a mere $10,000 ($105,000 minus $95,000). Dampening optimism
would widen the range again. However, at the extreme, efforts to quell a
client's optimism could result in loss of the client. Coyne, supra note 22, at 388.
150. See Korobkin, supra note 52, at 14; Rachlinski, supra note 56, at 118.
151. See Lederman, supra note 19, at 192-93. That is, although the taxpayer
initiates the suit, the IRS generally will obtain a positive recovery from a
successful suit, but the taxpayer who wins a suit (or obtains a favorable
settlement) generally will only avoid owing tax (unless the court finds that it
overpaid tax. See I.R.C. § 6512(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006)).
152. See Rachlinski, supra note 56, at 135; see also Coyne, supra note 22, at
386-87 ("Whether people choose the risk of trial over the certainty of settlement
may depend on whether they perceive their choice as involving a loss or a gain.
Generally, one would expect that plaintiffs (who stand to gain something) would
be more eager to settle, while defendants (who stand to lose something) would
be more reluctant to settle."); DiPippa, supra note 62, at 90-91 ("In general,
plaintiffs are more likely to frame settlement offers as choices among gains
while defendants are more likely to frame the same offers as choices among
losses."). Of course, the framing in any given litigation may not be as simple as
that. See Rachlinski, supra note 56, at 145.
153. See supra text accompanying note 70.
154. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 55, at 268-69.
155. See DiPippa, supra note 62, at 101-02.
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offer the taxpayer-client perceived as a loss, which might result in
the client settling more quickly.
An attorney might also help reduce unrealistic settlement
aspirations on the part of a client, 56 encouraging the client to accept
a reasonable settlement offer that is within the range the client
deemed acceptable but less than the client had hoped to achieve.
That might expedite settlements by increasing acceptance of earlier
offers.
Similarly, lawyers may also help temper taxpayer regret
aversion. Regret aversion suggests that litigants will try to avoid
closing off settlement options. Because rejecting an offer in the hope
of eventually settling for a larger amount increases the likelihood of
trial,57 litigants may do such things as try to keep existing
settlement offers open or respond to a settlement offer with a
counteroffer rather than a simple rejection.
Some studies have cast doubt on the effect of regret aversion
with respect to losses,"" but assuming that it does have an effect and
that attorneys reduce its prevalence, represented taxpayers should
be less likely than pro se taxpayers to agree to relatively
unfavorable settlements in order to avoid trial. That phenomenon
might affect the timing of settlement. For example, the IRS might
recognize this dynamic and, when negotiating with pro se taxpayers,
threaten to demand a more favorable settlement as trial approaches,
encouraging early settlement by those taxpayers.
In contrast to the likely effect attorneys' experience, expertise
and objectivity may have in expediting settlements, an agency cost
analysis predicts delay in settlements because an attorney paid by
the hour, as tax attorneys typically are, has an incentive to devote
more time to a case."19 Taxpayers' attorneys might make more pre-
trial motions than pro se taxpayers, for example. 6 ' These motions
156. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
157. See Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A
Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 226, 237 (1982).
158. See Garvin, supra note 60, at 418.
159. See Johnson, supra note 25, at 576; Baker, supra note 61, at 1989
("ITihe hourly rate lawyer has an incentive to 'pad' her bills, whether by
exaggerating the number of hours worked, doing unnecessary or redundant
work, or using lawyers to do work that could be done more cheaply and as well
by non-lawyers.").
160. Cf. Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 128, at 520 ("[Bly spending more
time on discovery, searching for legal precedents, fielding unattractive
settlement bids, and encouraging clients to refuse early settlement offers, a
lawyer can increase the time to settlement and billable hours."); Kritzer, supra
note 25, at 1969. Kritzer states:
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would increase the cost of cases billed by the hour and could prolong
resolution of the case."' Accordingly, Professor Lynn Baker has
argued that
the hourly rate encourages the attorney to settle the
defendant-client's case too slowly .... [B]ecause the hourly
rate attorney's compensation is not tied to the amount of the
ultimate settlement, the potential agency problem is not the
amount of the settlement, but only the speed with which a
"good" settlement, from the perspective of the defendant-client,
is reached ....162
One might expect that hourly fee lawyers would be inclined to devote
more time to things like legal research and writing briefs-activities
that could build up hours. Contingency fee lawyers might be expected
to devote more time to getting the case settled. However, the one
analysis that looked at this question found no evidence supporting
differences in work content that was related to the fee arrangement.
Id. (citing HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY
LITIGATION 121-23 (1990)). Kritzer also found that lawyers paid by the hour
may devote more time to small cases than their contingency fee counterparts
but that the reverse may be true for big cases. Id. at 1968; Herbert M. Kritzer
et al., The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
251, 266-67 (1985).
161. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 61, at 1988; Gilson & Mnookin, supra note
12, at 528; Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 21, at 123 ("Hourly fee
arrangements.., might impede settlement because the time required to stage a
trial enriches the lawyer while the client bears the attendant financial risk.");
Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189,
203 (1987) ("[IfM the attorney controls the settlement decision ... a purely
rational and self-interested attorney would never settle an hourly fee case in
which he or she is working for a profit.").
162. Baker, supra note 61, at 1988 (second emphasis added). She adds that
"the hourly rate lawyer is [also] likely to be (self-interestedly) optimistic in
assessing (or at least conveying to the client) the defendant-client's expected net
gain from going to trial." Id. at 1989. A client bearing those hourly costs has an
incentive to monitor the attorney to minimize unnecessary time expenditures.
See supra note 47. However, monitoring is likely to be imperfect, particularly
because lawyers have expertise that most clients do not, so it may be hard for
clients to evaluate lawyers' decisions. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We
Regulate Lawyers? An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and
Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 465 (2001) ("Because clients may not
be able to assess the quality of the legal services they receive, the traditional
responses to agency costs-express contractual protection, closer monitoring of
the agent, or a later lawsuit-are insufficient."); Cohen, supra note 47, at 280
("Some scholars have argued that... [agency] cost temptations are even greater
for lawyers. The reasons they have suggested for this phenomenon are that
lawyers' specialized expertise makes their recommendations about what legal
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However, note that a lawyer's incentive to maximize fees is
portfolio-based, rather than based on each case in isolation. 163 A
busy lawyer faces opportunity costs for each additional hour worked
because it is not possible to work an infinite number of hours; an
additional hour of work requires sacrificing an hour of leisure (or
sleep). Accordingly, it is primarily attorneys who are not working to
capacity who would have an incentive to bill additional hours prior
to settling a case. In addition, delay or excessive billings can entail
reputational costs (as can neglecting cases). 164
The transaction costs of litigation also may affect the timing of
settlement by influencing how long a party can hold out for a better
settlement opportunity.'65 Professors Paul Fenn and Neil Rickman
employed a multi-stage model of tort claim litigation 166 in which they
postulated that both lower legal costs for both sides and uncertainty
over the amount at stake (an asymmetric information issue) should
delay settlements. 67  In their empirical study of personal injury
claims against a British auto insurer's policy holders, they found
that cases believed by the insurer to be more costly for the plaintiff
were settled more quickly.68  They point out that the "results are
quite intuitive: the parties seek to settle earlier the more costly it
becomes to prolong the case."'69 Because taxpayers paying attorneys
services the client needs and how well those services are provided particularly
difficult to monitor and evaluate, even after the legal services have been
rendered, and that the misuse of information is harder for clients to police than
the misuse of physical assets entrusted to an agent's care.") (footnotes omitted).
163. Kritzer, supra note 25, at 1972.
164. Id. This is particularly true with respect to clients for whom the lawyer
undertakes or hopes to undertake ongoing representation. Interestingly, an
empirical study by Jason Scott Johnston and Joel Waldfogel found that "cases
that involve (contemporary) classmates are slower, and more likely to be tried,
than cases that involve nonclassmate attorneys .... It may indicate that these
attorneys are 'cooperating' by slowing down case resolution, against the
interests of their clients." Johnston & Waldfogel, supra note 24, at 55-58. They
explain that "this may represent the peculiar strategic incentives that face
attorneys who have established reputations long before they litigate against one
another." Id. at 55. Attorney "cooperation" of this type is a form of agency cost.
165. See Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 10 (2002) (discussing litigant "patience"). In the basic model of suit and
settlement, the more patient party should capture more of the surplus
generated by settlement. See id. at 10-11; see also supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
166. Paul Fenn & Neil Rickman, Asymmetric Information and the Settlement
of Insurance Claims, 68 J. RISK & INS. 615, 617-18 (2001).
167. See id. at 619-20.
168. Id. at 627.
169. Id.
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by the hour face greater increased transaction costs as the litigation
proceeds from one stage to the next than do pro se taxpayers,
represented taxpayers will have an incentive to settle earlier.
17
Thus, it is not clear as a theoretical matter, whether attorneys
tend to expedite or delay settlement. Table 6 reports the results of
the Ordinary Least Squares regression that considered the
relationship between the presence of an attorney for the taxpayer
and time to settlement. In the first column of Table 6, the Ordinary
Least Squares coefficient for Attorney is negative, suggesting that
the presence of taxpayer counsel decreased the amount of time it
took a settled case to settle. However, the p-value of the Attorney
variable shows that the coefficient is not statistically significant.
17
The second column of Table 6 presents the Selection Correction
regression results; the coefficient on the Attorney variable is not
statistically significant there, either. 172  Therefore, it appears
unlikely that the presence of taxpayer counsel reduces time to
settlement.
170. Cf id. ("[W]hen the insurer's perception of the plaintiffs legal costs per
day increases relative to the initial estimate, the settlement hazard rises, and
delay is therefore reduced.").
171. The p-value of the Attorney coefficient is 0.208. When the Appeals
variable, which is discussed in notes 98 and 181, was added to the regression,
the Attorney coefficient became -0.023, with a p-value of 0.879. Appeals had a
coefficient of 0.336 and a p-value of 0.119. The presence of an additional judge
is correlated with an increase of more than 4.5 months in time to settlement.
The number of net docket entries in the case is also positively related to the
time to settlement. Each docket entry corresponds to almost a one-month
increase in time to settlement. And finally, cases filed by estates and cases filed
later in the sample period settle more quickly than cases filed earlier in the
sample period. The fact that cases filed later in the sample period settled more
quickly than cases filed earlier in the sample period may be a reflection of the
fact that the Tax Court's caseload declined substantially during that time,
presumably reducing the workload of both Tax Court judges and IRS counsel.
IRS data reflects the following Tax Court "inventory" for fiscal years 1990
through 1994 (in thousands of dockets): 54.1 in 1990, 50.7 in 1991, 46.7 in 1992,
42.1 in 1993, and 32.5 in 1994. January 2001 IRS Report, supra note 14, at 3.
172. The results of the Selection Correction regression suggest that the
Ordinary Least Squares coefficient may be biased downward (overly negative)
because the coefficient on the Attorney variable in the Selection Correction
regression is smaller in magnitude. However, the Attorney variable in the
Selection Correction regression also has a higher p-value. The lambda
coefficient is not significant, though it is close to significance at the 0.05 level.
An insignificant lambda coefficient suggests that the OLS coefficients were not
affected by selection bias. See infra note 208.
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Table 6: Regression Results Showing Effect of Attorney
Representation on Time to Settlement
'(1) Ordinary Least Squares
Coefficient p-value
(2) Selection Correction
Coefficient p-value
Constant
Attorney
Individual '
Estate
More than One Judge
Any Penalty
Tax Years in Issue
Log(100+Stakes)
# Net Docket Entries
Year= 1990"
Year=1991
Year=1992
Year=1993
Year=1994
Central .
Mid-Atlantic
Mid-West
North-Atlantic
South-East
South-West
Trial State Differs
from Residence State
1.195
-0.195
-0.123
-0.450
0.198
-0.095
-0.068
0.041
0.087
-0.590
-0.521
-0.956
-1.036
-0.911
0.240
-0.324
0.313
0.250
0.150
0.184
-0.100
0.078
0.208
0.628
0.067
0.559
0.645
0.259
0.437
0.000*
0.049*
0.118
0.0001
0.0001
0.001*
0.231
0.278
0.407
0.275
0.340
0.301
0.607
Constant
Attorney
Individual
Estate
More than One Judge
Any Penalty
Tax Years in Issue
Log(100+Stakes)
# Net Docket Entries
Year=1990''
Year=1991
Year=1992
Year=1993
Year=1994
Central "
Mid-Atlantic
Mid-West
North-Atlantic
South-East
South-West
Trial State Differs
from Residence State
Lambda
Number of Observations = 199Omitted group for taxpayer type is Corporation.
Omitted group for year of filing is pre-1990.
Omitted group for region is West.
0.653
-0.071
-0.198
-0.396
0.359
0.100
-0.107
0.080
0.038
-0.677
-0.436
-0.793
-0.823
-0.725
0.049
-0.639
0.260
0.229
0.199
0.228
-0.125
0.278
0.689
0.385
0.215
0.127
0.628
0.112
0.107
0.168
0.010**
0.085
0.001*
0.0001*
0.017**
0.854
0.122
0.290
0.312
0.366
0.219
0.487
0.813 0.052
* p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
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C. Implications of the Empirical Study of Timing of Settlements
and Trials
The lack of significance of the results with respect to timing of
Tax Court case resolutions suggests that attorneys paid by the hour
neither systematically delay cases nor systematically expedite them,
consistent with the ambiguous predictions of theory. 7 3 As discussed
supra in Part III.A, trial dates likely are largely under the court's
control,'74 and delay in the trial date likely is primarily a function of
continuances. 175
It is possible that attorneys and pro se taxpayers are equally
likely to obtain continuances, although they may request them for
different reasons. Pro se taxpayers may seek to postpone a decision
on their liability. Attorneys may at times seek continuances
because of the difficulty of scheduling a trial when balancing other
cases. Delay occasioned by attorney caseload would be a form of
agency cost, though presumably one that would not result in an
increase in legal fees. However, a Tax Court procedural rule limits
that cost to clients by generally forbidding continuances based on
"[c] onflicting engagements of counsel."'76
In the end, it may be the case that, in accordance with theory,
some attorneys, such as repeat representatives in Tax Court, tend to
resolve cases more quickly than pro se litigants, while other
attorneys, such as those less familiar with Tax Court litigation, tend
to resolve cases more slowly.'77 The good news in this regard is that
173. By contrast, one study found "that the time to settlement is 21% longer
in cases that are contingency fee limited," Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 128,
at 537, which therefore presumably involve a greater proportion of hourly fee-
based compensation. Id. at 519-20. As discussed in note 128, at least two
studies of insurance payments to automobile accident victims found that the
presence of an attorney was associated with a greater number of days until final
payment. See HAMMITT, supra note 128, at 62-67; ROLPH ET AL., supra note 128,
at 24-25; ROSS, supra note 121, at 228-29. Attorneys in those cases typically are
paid on a contingency-fee basis. See supra note 128.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 132-35.
175. See supra text accompanying note 136.
176. TAx CT. R. PRAc. & PROC. 133.
177. An alternative explanation for the lack of a statistically significant
result in the settlement context is that the IRS may finalize settlements with
pro se taxpayers as soon as possible but may trust attorneys to adhere to an
oral settlement agreement and so may not complete the documentation until a
convenient later date (such as at the calendar call for the trial session). This
effect would mask quicker settlements by attorneys. However, this
phenomenon would not explain why there was no statistically significant
difference in pro se and represented cases with respect to the timing of trial.
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any notion that lawyers systematically drag cases out 17" receives no
support from the results of this study.
CONCLUSION
Intuitively, one might expect parties represented by experienced
attorneys who are legal experts and seasoned negotiators to obtain
more favorable case outcomes than unrepresented parties. Parties
presumably pay for representation largely for that reason.
Similarly, one might expect that attorneys influence the timing of
trials and settlements through their pre-trial motions and other
procedural choices, as well as by their very presence as agents and
their influence on their clients' decisions.
Consistent with intuition, this study, employing a unique data
set consisting of a random sample of Tax Court cases, found that
taxpayer representation has a significant effect on financial outcome
in cases that go to trial. Interestingly, and in accordance with
intuition, the magnitude of the effect increases with the experience
of the attorney and remains highly statistically significant.
Surprisingly, the study did not find similar results in settled
cases. Instead, it found nothing to indicate that attorneys affect the
amount of Tax Court settlements. This suggests a similarity in
negotiation outcomes of attorneys and unrepresented litigants in
Tax Court cases. Thus, the results suggest that taxpayers' attorneys
make their greatest contributions in trials, where the party to be
persuaded is a judge rather than a government attorney-and
where procedural expertise carries its greatest importance.
7 9
178. Cf Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 12, at 510-11.
179. Although only a small percentage of Tax Court cases go to trial, the
average reduction in the IRS's recovery is substantial enough that although tax
attorneys in the private sector generally are paid by the hour, representation is
likely cost-effective for cases with a substantial amount at stake, whether in the
single litigation or because of the possible effect of a precedent on a taxpayer
facing a recurring issue. The study does not directly address the question of
whether it is efficient to hire an attorney. However, a rough calculation
suggests that it is. As discussed in text accompanying note 107, the average tax
savings from hiring counsel in a hypothetical tried case with the mean amount
at stake would be $1,045,670. Assuming a five-percent likelihood of trial, as
discussed in note 13, results in an expected savings of $52,284. In many cases
that will exceed the cost of the taxpayer's attorney, as suggested by the
amounts of attorneys' fees claimed in cases involving taxpayer litigation for
recovery of those fees. See, e.g., Dang v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2002-282
(taxpayer incurred attorney's fees of $9,821 (reporter appears to have
mistakenly reported this figure as $19,821); Regimbal v. United States, 2001-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,583 (E.D. Wash. June 29, 2001) (taxpayer sought
recovery of attorney's fees of $24,174); Kremer v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2000-
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The results of the study also suggest that taxpayers' attorneys,
on average, do not have a significant effect on the timing of case
resolutions. The study thus found no support for the idea that
attorneys delay case resolutions where they are paid by the hour.
Attorneys did not close cases any faster than unrepresented
litigants did, either.
Although this study was of Tax Court cases, it should provide
valuable insights for other civil litigation. The Tax Court is a useful
laboratory for the study of civil litigation, given its mix of pro se and
represented taxpayers, its records on settlements, and its
quantifiable results. The study's results certainly support the idea
that lawyers add significant value for their clients in cases that go to
trial and that they do not impose unnecessary costs on clients by
dragging their feet as the meter ticks.
119 (taxpayer incurred litigation costs of $14,785); Salopek v. Comm'r, T.C.M.
(RIA) 1998-385 (taxpayers claimed $95,513 in litigation costs).
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APPENDIX
THE VARIABLES AND STATISTICAL METHODOLOGIES
The data used in this study consist of approximately 385 Tax
Court cases,180 about half of which settled.' The cases involve
individuals, estates, and corporations litigating a federal tax
deficiency against the IRS."' They are a random sample of cases
decided mostly in the early- to mid-1990s, 83 except that because only
180. See infra Table 7. The full data set used in this study consists of 567
cases. However, as indicated in note 182 and accompanying text, a number of
cases were eliminated from the sample because they were not deficiency cases.
A few cases had been closed as duplicative. Several cases were small tax cases;
these were dropped from the sample because the opinions and files in those
cases were not publicly available at the time the initial data was collected. See
Leandra Lederman, Tax Court S Cases: Does the 'S' Stand for Secret?, 79 TAx
NoTEs 257 (1998). In addition, a few cases were eliminated because they
remained unresolved as of July 2005. Cases missing values for any variable
were not used in regressions containing that variable. See Lederman, supra
note 13, app. B at 348-49. In 2001, the Tax Court put a docket inquiry system
on its website. The website states that the on-line docket inquiry system covers
cases from May 1, 1986 to the present. United States Tax Court: Docket
Inquiry, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/docket.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
However, even the oldest cases in the data set, which were docketed in 1981,
were found in the docket inquiry system. We attempted to fill in missing values
from the docket inquiry system, other public sources such as the Lexis
database, and from Tax Court files. However, some cases simply did not have
certain information (such as the judge assigned to a case that was settled before
a judge was assigned), and some information was no longer available.
181. Cases in which decision was entered based on a stipulation of the
parties were coded as settled. Settlements with the Appeals Office that occur
after the case is docketed in Tax Court are reflected in the data used in this
study as settled cases. In other words, the study does not distinguish between
cases settled with IRS counsel or with the IRS Appeals Office, so long as the
settlement occurs after docketing in Tax Court. The data set does contain
information about whether or not a case had an IRS appeal prior to being
docketed in Tax Court, but only on a subset of the cases. We did not use the
variable in the principal regressions because of the effect it would have on the
sample size. Cases in which decision was entered based on an opinion of the
court were coded as tried cases, even if the decision was entered without a trial,
such as on a motion for summary judgment. However, cases with no trial were
excluded from the regressions in which time to trial was the dependent
variable.
182. Cases that did not involve a tax deficiency, such as those involving tax-
exempt organizations seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to tax-
exempt status, were eliminated from the sample.
183. The data were initially collected primarily in the summer of 1995 from
Tax Court case files, published opinions, and other publicly available materials.
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about five percent of cases go to trial, tried cases (opinion decisions)
were over-sampled so that they would represent approximately half
of the sample, and because of limits on the length of time the Tax
Court keeps complete records in settled cases, a stratified sampling
was done so that more cases were selected from certain years than
others. 14
The few cases in which the taxpayer's representative was an
accountant (or not clearly an attorney) were dropped. 85 Similarly,
cases in which an unrepresented taxpayer was an attorney,
accountant, or had legal education were also excluded so that we
could isolate the effects of attorney status on case outcomes. 186 In
the time to trial regressions, cases that were decided by the court
without a trial (such as on summary judgment) were excluded." 7
See Lederman, supra note 13, app. A at 345-47. Cases were randomly selected
in two ways: (1) Using randomly generated docket numbers for the years 1989
through 1994, reflecting cases filed in those years, and (2) using randomly
generated numbers to select from LexisNexis printouts of Tax Court cases with
opinions issued in 1990 through 1995. See id. app. A at 345. Accordingly, the
filing dates of the 567 cases span 1981 through 1994. The data for these cases
were augmented beginning in 2003. Some of them were tried or settled after
the initial study was conducted; they were coded as such so long as they were
resolved by July 2005.
184. See id. app. A at 346. The Tax Court retains for approximately one
year the full file in settled cases. See id. The decision document and, since
2001, the information contained in the Tax Court's on-line docket inquiry
system at www.ustaxcourt.gov, generally remain available after that. Using a
random number generator, 100 cases docketed in 1989 were selected, eighty
docketed in 1990, 100 docketed in 1991, 150 docketed in 1992, 133 docketed in
1993, and seventy docketed in 1994. Id. Some of these turned out to be opinion
decisions. See id. Any docket number that turned out to be a small tax case
was excluded from the sample because, at the time, the Tax Court would not
grant access to files or opinions in those cases. See supra note 180.
185. Non-attorneys who pass a difficult examination are entitled to
represent others in Tax Court. See I.R.C. § 7452 (LexisNexis 2006); TAX CT. R.
PRAC. & PROC. 200(a)(3). As discussed above, because cases involving tax
protestors might be idiosyncratic, many regressions were conducted both with
and without the individuals identified as tax protestors included in the sample.
See supra note 104. The results were similar whether or not the tax protestors
were included, and the tax protestors therefore were generally retained in each
sample. See id.
186. In the data used in this study, in the final sample used in the recovery
ratio regressions, 32.12% of the taxpayers were pro se in the sense that they
were not represented at any point in the Tax Court proceedings. That figure
was 31.5% in settled cases and 32.8% in tried cases. In the full data set, before
non-deficiency cases and cases with missing values were deleted, 42% of
taxpayers were pro se.
187. Initially, we eliminated from the data set cases that were dismissed by
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As discussed supra in the Introduction, the study examined two
different types of outcomes-length of time until case resolution and
the IRS's recovery ratio (the IRS's recovery as a percentage of the
total amount at stake)-as well as two subsamples of cases-settled
and tried. Thus, there were four separate models, with four distinct
dependent variables: (1) IRS recovery ratio in tried cases; (2) IRS
recovery ratio in settled cases; (3) time to trial; and (4) time to
settlement. The study tested the effect of the presence of counsel for
the taxpayer on each of the four outcomes. 8 In addition, the study
examined whether the attorney's years of experience affected any of
these outcomes.'89 We used the statistical technique of Ordinary
Least Squares ("OLS") for each of the four models. 9 ° Each of the
models therefore assumed a linear relationship between the
dependent variable (the outcome examined) and a number of
independent variables, as follows:
Tax Court Outcome = A*Attorney + B*Independent Variables +
Error Term
Assuming that none of the explanatory variables are correlated with
the error term,'91 OLS will produce unbiased estimates.
The outcome examined, which is the dependent variable, is
either Time to Case Resolution (in years) or IRS Recovery Ratio (as
the court (such as for lack of jurisdiction). However, the Tax Court may dismiss
a case for lack of jurisdiction that would otherwise be properly be brought in
Tax Court but has a technical defect, such as IRS failure to send the notice of
deficiency to the taxpayer's last known address (or provide actual notice to the
taxpayer). See Lederman, supra note 19, at 185-86. Dismissed cases were
therefore examined for determination of whether they should be dropped from
the data set; some were, but those that were in effect a victory for one party or
the other were retained.
188. We treated a taxpayer as having attorney representation if an attorney
was present as a representative at any point in the case, even if the attorney
entered the case after the petition was filed or withdrew before decision was
entered.
189. Attorney experience was calculated using year of graduation from law
school (or year of bar admission where year of graduation was not available) as
the starting point and the filing date of the case as the ending point. Attorney
experience is therefore case-specific. It also does not necessarily reflect years of
admission to the Tax Court bar. The attorney experience variable takes on the
value of zero if the taxpayer is pro se.
190. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 148-50 (2d ed. 1993).
OLS produces a regression line that best fits the data by minimizing the sum of
squared residuals, that is, the square of the difference between the observed
and predicted values of the dependent variable. See id. at 149.
191. That is, the expectation of the error term, conditional on the other
independent variables and the Attorney variable, is zero: E[Error Term
Independent Variables, Attorney] = 0.
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a percentage of the stakes). The Attorney variable is a dummy
variable 192 that simply reflects the presence or absence of counsel for
the taxpayer in the Tax Court case. In some regressions, the
Attorney variable was replaced with Attorney's Years of Experience
(which takes on a value of zero for pro se taxpayers). The
magnitude and statistical significance of A, the coefficient on that
variable, is the focus of this study.
There are multiple explanatory variables included in each
equation; B represents the coefficients of all of these variables.
Those variables include the following:
0 The log of the financial stakes, which is the sum of the
deficiency claimed by the IRS'93 and any overpayment
claimed by the taxpayer. 194 Financial stakes were slightly
192. Because the variable simply reflects the presence or absence of
taxpayer counsel (1 if the taxpayer has counsel and 0 otherwise), it is a dummy
variable. That is, it does not reflect a range of possible values. See GREENE,
supra note 190, at 229.
193. Where we knew of amounts asserted by the IRS in its answer or an
amended answer, typically from an opinion in the case, we included those in the
stakes. The deficiency claimed by the IRS includes the estimated value of any
time-sensitive penalty, typically a penalty that is an amount equal to fifty
percent of the interest on the deficiency. Those time-sensitive penalties
generally applied, as reflected in a prior version of Internal Revenue Code
§ 6653, "beginning on the last date prescribed by law for payment of such
underpayment (determined without regard to any extension) and ending on the
date of the assessment of the tax (or, if earlier, the date of the payment of the
tax)." I.R.C. § 6653(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1982) (current version at I.R.C.
§ 6653(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2006)). For purposes of this study, the penalty was
computed as arising on the unextended due date of the return (April 15 for
individuals) and accruing until the date of the notice of deficiency. If that date
was not available, forty-five days prior to the petition date was used; except
when addressed to a taxpayer outside the United States, a Tax Court petition is
due ninety days after the notice of deficiency was mailed. Id. § 6213(a).
However, interest itself, including penalty interest (interest at an increased
rate), was not included in the stakes. We tried including a dummy variable
reflecting whether the IRS had asserted penalty interest, but we were missing
that information on too many of the cases to include the variable in the final
regressions.
194. We used the log of stakes rather than the stakes themselves because
some of the stakes amounts were extremely large, and might otherwise have a
disproportionate effect on the coefficient of the stakes variable. In computing
the stakes, the overpayment claim amount was treated as zero if we did not
have it, even if the taxpayer recovered an overpayment. The principal effect of
this is on the IRS's recovery ratio. If the recovery ratio was lower than negative
1, which could happen where an overpayment was recovered but not reflected in
the stakes, it was treated as -1.
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correlated with taxpayer representation.' 95
" Whether the IRS asserted any penalty or addition to tax
(other than a frivolous litigation penalty, which would not
have been asserted had the taxpayer not litigated the case).
In a sense, this variable is a proxy for case quality; the IRS
might apply a penalty in cases that are relatively weaker
cases for taxpayers.
* Type of taxpayer: individual, corporation, or estate.196 The
identity of the taxpayer might affect the actual stakes in the
case in ways not captured by the monetary stakes variable.
For example, corporations might be more likely to anticipate
facing the same issue in the future and thus have stakes that
exceed the financial stakes in the particular litigation.
* The number of tax years in issue in the case. This is a
(probably weak) proxy for complexity and also may help
indicate cases in which the taxpayer faces a recurring issue
197
and therefore higher stakes.
* As a proxy for complexity of the case, the number of entries
between docketing and the first decision in the case in the
Tax Court's on-line docket entry system, net of entries solely
related to the presence of counsel ("net docket entries").
* Dummy variables for the year in which the case was filed.
This helps address time effects, particularly because the Tax
Court's inventory declined over the period studied, 98 which
should expedite case dispositions in later years.
" Whether the state in which the city selected for trial was
located differed from the state in which the taxpayer resided
at the time the petition was filed. These cases might be
different from other cases because the taxpayer might be
hoping to avoid local publicity, for example, which could also
provide an incentive to the taxpayer to resolve the case
195. The correlation was approximately 0.14 in tried cases and 0.15 in
settled cases.
196. Partnership cases were excluded from the sample because partnership
adjustments are not directly comparable to deficiencies.
197. Of course, multiple tax years do not necessarily present the same issue.
198. See supra note 171.
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quickly and as favorably as possible.
" The IRS region in which the state of trial was located. This
was included because IRS attorneys reportedly differed by
region in ways that might expedite or delay case resolutions
and IRS recoveries, particularly in settled cases. 9
* Whether or not there was more than one judge involved in
the case. Cases involving more than one judge might take
longer to resolve. The value of the case might also be less
predictable if multiple judges are involved, which could affect
settlement outcomes as litigants "bargain in the shadow of
the law."20 0 The involvement of multiple judges in the case
might also affect trial outcomes.20 '
Table 7, below, shows the means of all of the variables discussed
above, in both settled cases and tried cases, based on the sample
used for the "recovery ratio" outcome regressions.0 2 Table 7 also
199. Cf Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, Local Control of the
Bureaucracy: Federal Appeals Courts, Ideology, and the Internal Revenue
Service, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 233, 253 (2003) (finding regional variation in
proportion of business audits, correlating with Court of Appeals ideology). As in
the prior study that used this data set, we used for the region variable the seven
IRS regions that existed in 1995. See Lederman, supra note 13, app. C at 352.
However, the prior study used the state in which the taxpayer resided at the
time the Tax Court petition was filed for purposes of determining the region.
For this study, we opted to determine region based on the state selected for
trial, which more closely reflects which IRS attorneys handled the case. In
approximately 12.5% of the cases, the region of residence and the region of trial
differed, or data on one or the other was missing.
200. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
201. The model was focused on the effects of attorneys, not judges, on case
outcomes. We did collect additional information on the principal judge assigned
to each case but did not use those variables in the final analyses. For example,
we examined the years remaining to the expiration of the judge's term, to see if
the possibility of reappointment might have an effect on the results. This
variable could only apply to regular judges, not senior judges or Special Trial
Judges. The subsample containing this variable was therefore very small, so
this variable was not used in the final regressions. In addition, we collected
information on the gender of the principal judge assigned to the case. Most of
the judges were male, and this variable was not used in Professor Lederman's
prior study, so we did not include it in the judge variables used in the selection
correction regressions.
202. There were 199 cases in the sample used for the settlement-time
regression and 161 cases in the trial-time regression sample. The sample of
tried cases used for the regression for IRS's recovery ratio is larger than the
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includes information on the Tax Protestor variable, which, as
discussed below, was used as an instrumental variable in the
regressions involving tried cases.203
As Table 7 reflects, tried cases in the sample took longer, on
average, to resolve than settled cases did (1.75 years rather than
1.42 years, overall, a difference of approximately four months). For
both the settled and tried subsamples, cases involving an attorney
took longer to resolve, on average, than cases in which the taxpayer
was pro se. In the settled subsample, the average difference was
approximately four months, and for the tried subsample, the
average difference was approximately 6.5 months. Table 7 also
shows that the IRS's average recovery ratio was higher in tried
cases (approximately sixty-nine percent) than in settled cases
(thirty-two percent), consistent with the notion that the IRS, a
repeat player, brings to trial cases it is more likely to win and
thereby obtain a favorable precedent.
0 4
sample used for time to trial because cases decided based on an opinion of the
court without a trial (such as on summary judgment) were included in the
recovery ratio sample but were excluded when computing time to trial.
203. As Table 7 shows, the average amount at stake was substantially
higher in cases in which the taxpayer had counsel than in cases in which the
taxpayer was unrepresented, for both the settled and tried groups of cases,
which is consistent with the notion that it makes more economic sense for a
taxpayer to hire a lawyer when the financial stakes are greater, particularly
because tax attorneys generally charge by the hour. The average stakes overall
and for cases involving an attorney were substantially higher for cases that
went to trial than for those that settled. However, in cases in which the
taxpayer was not represented, the average stakes were higher in the group that
settled than in the group that went to trial. It may be that pro se taxpayers are
wary of trials and that they are therefore less willing to proceed to trial when
more money is at stake. That wariness could be due to lack of comfort with
litigation or "regret aversion." Regret aversion is discussed in note 60 and
accompanying text and text accompanying notes 155-56.
204. See, e.g., Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law,
84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2004); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection
of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 28 (1984); J. Mark Ramseyer &
Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
571, 577 (1999).
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Table 7: Means/Percentages of All Dependent and
Independent Variables
Settled Cases
All Pro se Rep*
Time to Settlement or Trial
(Years)'
Percentage of Stakes IRS
Received"
Represented by Attorney
Attorney's Years of
Experience"
Individual
Corporation
Estate
Number of Cases for Taxpayer
Number of Net Docket Entries
More than One Judge
Year of Filing = pre-1990
Year of Filing = 1990
Year of Filing = 1991
Year of Filing = 1992
Year of Filing = 1993
Year of Filing = 1994
Central Region
Mid-Atlantic Region
Mid-West Region
North-Atlantic Region
South-East Region
South-West Region
West Region
Number of Tax Years in Issue
Any Penalty Asserted by IRS
Stakes
Trial & Residence State Differ
Tax Protestor"m
Pre-Docketing IRS Appeal"
Special Trial Judge
Judge Decade=pre-1980s
Judge Decade=1980s
Judge Decade=1990s
Private Sector Experience for
Judge
Number of Observations
1.42
32.1%
68.5%
80.2%
11.7%
8.1%
1.52
9.41
14.7%
20.3%
8.1%
10.2%
24.4%
28.9%
8.1%
8.1%
3.0%
9.6%
12.1%
11.7%
20.3%
35.0%
1.70
80.2%
Tried Cases
All Pro se Rep*
1.18 1.53 1.75 1.34
28.7% 33.7% 68.7% 88.6%
0.0% 100.0% 67.2% 0.0%
0 12.19
95.2% 73.3%
3.2% 15.6%
1.6% 11.1%
1.53 1.52
7.94 10.08
4.8% 19.3%
4.8% 27.4%
1.6% 11.1%
4.8% 12.6%
37.1% 18.5%
38.7% 24.4%
12.9% 5.9%
6.5% 8.9%
4.8% 2.2%
8.1% 10.4%
8.1% 14.1%
11.3% 11.9%
19.4% 20.7%
41.9% 31.9%
1.35 1.87
88.7% 76.3%
0
83.6% 98.4%
12.7% 1.6%
3.7% 0.0%
1.55 1.57
25.95 18.56
20.6% 17.7%
46.0% 43.6%
16.4% 12.9%
12.2% 11.3%
11.6% 11.3%
10.6% 14.5%
3.2% 6.5%
13.8% 6.5%
13.2% 14.5%
9.0% 9.7%
8.5% 6.5%
11.1% 9.7%
14.8% 14.5%
29.6% 38.7%
2.54 2.66
67.2% 74.2%
1.90
59.0%
100.0%
11.12
76.4%
18.1%
5.5%
1.54
29.55
22.1%
47.2%
18.1%
12.6%
11.8%
8.7%
1.6%
17.3%
12.6%
8.7%
9.4%
11.8%
15.0%
25.2%
2.49
63.8%
$233,839 $77,494 $305,641 $2,979,117 $53,677 $4,407,285
18.3% 12.9% 20.7% 25.4% 24.2% 26.0%
.. .. .. 11.6% 30.7% 2.4%
17.5% 8.6% 22.9% 44.1% 31.3% 49.2%
16.8% 16.1% 17.0%
24.9% 12.9% 30.3%
68.5% 80.6% 63.0%
6.6% 6.5% 6.7%
81.7% 77.4% 83.7%
23.8% 32.3% 19.7%
28.6% 30.7% 27.5%
57.1% 53.2% 59.1%
14.3% 16.1% 13.4%
70.4% 66.1% 72.4%
197 62 135 189 62 127
. "Rep" means taxpayer was represented by an attorney.
'The means of this variable reflect the sample used for the time regressions. The means of the other
variables presented reflect the sample used for the ratio regressions.
" Values greater than 1 were reset to 1; values less than -1 were reset to -1.
' The size of the sample used in the settlement-ratio regression containing the Attorney Experience
variable was 178. The size of the sample used in the trial-ratio regression containing this variable
was 165.
The Tax Protestor dummy variable was used as an instrumental variable in 2SLS regressions in
tried cases.
' The Appeals variable was not used in most regressions. The size of the sample used in the
settlement-ratio and trial-ratio regressions containing this variable were 154 and 170, respectively.
There were two possible sources of bias in the OLS regressions
in this study. First, Tax Court cases are not randomly selected for
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settlement or trial,0° which will cause biased OLS coefficients if
selection is correlated with (1) the dependent variable and (2) any
independent variable in the OLS regression. We used a
Heckman two-step estimation procedure to address this issue.
The first step of the Heckman method estimates a probit (binary
choice) model, using the full sample of cases that settle and cases
205. See Lederman, supra note 13, at 332; cf Priest & Klein, supra note 204,
at 4 (explaining that, in their model, a non-random selection of lawsuits will fail
to settle).
206. In other words, assume that, for cases that settle, there is some
unobserved selection criterion. Assume further that the selection criterion is a
linear function of some variables and an unobserved error term. (Z* = Wit + u
where Z* is the unobserved selection criterion, W is a matrix of explanatory
variables (the OLS variables plus the variables describing the presiding judge),
7r is the matrix of corresponding coefficients, and u is the error term). If we
assume that we know only the direction of the effect but not its magnitude (the
sign of Z* but not its absolute value), so that cases that settle are those where
the selection criterion is positive and those that go to trial are cases in which
the selection criterion is zero or negative, then there is selection bias if the
unobserved error term in the OLS regressions is correlated with the error term
in the selection equation, u.
207. See James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,
47 ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979). A Heckman procedure is appropriate when the
sample non-randomly omits a particular type of data. Because cases are not
randomly selected for trial or settlement, both data subsamples in this study
may manifest selection bias that could bias the OLS results.
208. Continuing the example in footnote 206, for cases that settle, the
probability that a case settles is a nonlinear function of the independent
variables in the OLS regression along with the variables describing the
presiding judge. That is, Prob(Case Settles) = (Wz), where 0 represents the
standard normal distribution. In this scenario, the OLS regression in the text,
Tax Court Outcome = A*Attorney + B*Independent Variables + Error Term
is actually:
Time to Settlement = A*Attorney + B*Independent Variables + Error Term
[observed only if case settles]
where the selection regression and OLS error terms are distributed bivariate
normal, each with a mean of zero, the former with a standard deviation of one,
the latter with standard deviation equal to a, and with p representing the
correlation between the two error terms. In other words, (u, Error Term) -
bivariate normal(0,0, 1,oE2, p).
To control for this selection bias, the regression desired is:
Time to Settlement (Given Settlement) = A*Attorney + B*Independent Variables
+ C*Lambda + Error Term
where C = p*ui and Lambda is a non-linear function of the Probability of
Settlement. This new OLS regression with Lambda included as an explanatory
variable controls for any selection bias. If selection bias is not present, the
coefficient C will not be statistically significant.
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that go to trial. The dependent variable takes on the value of one if
the case settles, and zero if the case goes to trial. The explanatory
variables in this step include the explanatory variables used in the
OLS equation, as well as variables related to whether or not a case
settles. Professor Lederman's previous study of Tax Court case
outcomes found that certain characteristics of the judge assigned to
the case predict whether a case will settle or go to trial;219 we assume
that those relationships hold here.1 ° The judge variables, which are
included in Table 7, were:
* Whether or not the principal judge assigned to the case was a
Special Trial Judge. Special Trial Judges are employees at
will appointed by the Chief Judge of the Tax Court, unlike
the regular judges, who are appointed by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, for renewable fifteen-
year terms."'
" Dummy variables for the decade in which the principal judge
involved in the case was appointed to the bench.
• Whether or not the principal judge assigned to the case had
private-sector experience before becoming a judge.
In the Heckman procedure, the first-step probit results are used
to derive estimates of the predicted probability of selection into a
subsample (such as cases that settle). A non-linear function of this
estimated probability (the inverse Mill's ratio, lambda) is included in
the second-step OLS regression that uses only that subsample. The
second step simply includes the predicted lambda as an explanatory
variable in the OLS specification, in order to correct for selection
bias. If the coefficient on the predicted lambda is not significantly
different from zero, this generally suggests that selection bias is not
present. As reported in Tables 1 through 4, lambda was not
209. See Lederman, supra note 13, at 332; supra note 17.
210. In this study, we used the three judge variables that were found to be
statistically significant in the prior study, see Lederman, supra note 13, at 332,
except that for the judge's background, a dummy variable reflecting the
presence or absence of private sector experience was used. Also, the prior study
used data on the judge who entered the decision. This study used data on the
judge involved in the case for the longest period of time, if more than one judge
was involved in the case. That information was obtained from the Tax Court's
on-line docket inquiry system.
211. I.R.C. § 7443(b), (e) (LexisNexis 2006) (appointment and term of office
of regular Tax Court judges); id. § 7443A(a) (authority of Chief Judge to appoint
Special Trial Judges).
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statistically significant in any of the regressions, suggesting the
absence of selection bias.
The second possible source of bias in the OLS regression results
is that the hiring of an attorney is non-random. That is, taxpayers
choose whether or not to hire an attorney. Unobserved factors may
influence both the decision to hire an attorney and the outcome of
the case (time involved or recovery ratio, depending on the model),
21presenting an endogeneity issue. 12 To control for this bias requires,
for each of the four models, an "instrumental variable" that was
correlated with the decision to hire an attorney but not with the
outcome being tested. 13 That instrument would be used in the first
stage of a Two-Stage Least Squares ("2SLS") model in which, in the
first stage, the Attorney dummy variable is regressed on the other
independent variables and the instrumental variable. Then, the
predicted value for Attorney status from this first stage would be
substituted for actual Attorney status in the second stage.214 For
tried cases, Tax Protestor was used as an instrumental variable
because tax protestors were disproportionately pro se and tax
protestor status was not directly correlated with time to trial or IRS
215
recovery ratio in tried cases.
The 2SLS results using the Tax Protestor variable as an
instrument in time to trial and IRS recovery ratio in tried cases are
reported in Table 8, below. Settled cases presented a more difficult
context than tried cases for development of a suitable instrumental
212. There are statistical techniques that control for selection bias and
endogeneity bias together. However, the sample size did not allow us to utilize
these techniques, so we addressed each source of bias separately.
213. A proper instrument may vary depending on the tax outcome being
investigated. As an example, if there were a change in the tax law such that
there was a tax deduction for attorney's fees in some years relevant to the study
but not in others, a dummy variable reflecting whether or not the deduction was
available might be a good instrument because it should be related to the
decision whether to hire an attorney but not to IRS recovery ratio, at least in
tried cases. (In settled cases, the IRS theoretically could capture part of the
value to the taxpayer of the tax deduction.)
214. In contrast to the selection regressions, both stages of 2SLS involve
only the subsample of cases that either settle or go to trial, depending on the
Tax Court outcome being investigated. In calculating the standard errors of the
2SLS coefficients, the actual Attorney values are used instead of the predicted
values.
215. The correlation between Tax Protestor and Time to Trial was -0.10, and
the correlation between Tax Protestor and Trial Ratio was 0.22. The correlation
between Tax Protestor and Attorney was -0.41 in the trial-ratio subsample. The
correlation between Tax Protestor and Attorney's Years of Experience was -0.32
in the trial-ratio subsample.
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variable because of the lack of information about the taxpayers
whose cases settled. For settled cases, we tested a number of
variables as instruments. However, each of these were either not
related to the hiring of an attorney, were directly related to Tax
Court outcomes, or both. The 2SLS results were often dramatically
different from the OLS and Selection results, and often
S 216
nonsensical.
Table 8: Two-Stage Least Squares Results for Time and
Recovery Ratio Outcomes in Tried Casest
Time to Trial: Two-Stage
Least Squares
Constant
Attorney
Individualt"
Estate
More than One Judg
Any Penalty
Tax Years in Issue
Log(100+Stakes)
# Net Docket Entrie.,
Year=1990"
Year=1991
Year=1992
Year=1993
Year=1994
Central*...
Mid-Atlantic
Mid-West
North-Atlantic
South-East
South-West
Trial State Differs
from Residence Stat(
Coefficient p-value
-0.450 0.631
0.751 0.187
1.060 0.003*
0.623 0.091
e 1.095 0.003*
0.119 0.561
-0.046 0.309
-0.006 0.944
0.032 0.001*
-0.555 0.009*
-0.357 0.050
-0.774 0.002*
-0.712 0.008*
-0.429 0.216
-0.150 0.531
-0.178 0.686
-0.076 0.817
0.003 0.990
0.344 0.406
0.205 0.456
0.183 0.471
IRS Recovery Ratio in Tried Cases:
Two-Stage Least Squares
Coefficient p-value
Constant 1.378 0.0001*
Attorney -0.351 0.001*
Individual" -0.153 0.198
Estate -0.375 0.138
More than One Judge 0.037 0.644
Any Penalty 0.224 0.002*
Tax Years in Issue -0.013 0.319
Log(100+Stakes) -0.038 0.058
# Net Docket Entries -0.001 0.746
Year=1990"' 0.039 0.620
Year=1991 -0.019 0.846
Year=1992 0.048 0.599
Year=1993 0.030 0.761
Year=1994 -0.152 0.312
Central"" -0.049 0.645
Mid-Atlantic -0.135 0.221
Mid-West -0.094 0.309
North-Atlantic -0.017 0.881
South-East -0.064 0.533
South-West -0.083 0.393
Trial State Differs 0.169 0.021**
from Residence State
Number of observations = 161
t Instrumental Variable is Tax Protestor.
" Omitted group for taxpayer type is Corporation.
" Omitted group for year of filing is pre-1990.
,"" Omitted group for region is West.
Number of observations = 189
* p < .01
** p < .05
216. For example, using Total Number of Cases for Taxpayer as an
instrumental variable, we found that the presence of an attorney for the
taxpayer in settled cases increased the time to decision by approximately sixty-
two years. The p-value was 0.96.
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As Table 8 shows, results of the 2SLS regression using Tax
Protestor as an instrument in the time to trial regression did not
result in statistical significance of the Attorney variable. The
results are generally very similar to the OLS results shown in Table
5. 217 A comparison of Table 8 and Table 1218 reveals that the results
of the 2SLS regression in the IRS Recovery Ratio in Tried Cases
show a stronger effect of the Attorney variable than in the OLS
regression, while remaining highly statistically significant. 219 These
results are explained supra in Part II.A.22°
217. See supra text accompanying note 140.
218. Table 2 presents the comparison, but in abbreviated form.
219. None of the coefficients of the other variables are significant at the 0.05
level except for Any Penalty and Trial State Differs from Residence State,
which have similar coefficients and p-values as those in the OLS regression
(shown in Table 1).
220. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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